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THE  MEANINGS  OF  THE  “PRIVILEGES  AND
IMMUNITIES  OF  CITIZENS”  ON  THE  EVE
OF THE CIVIL WAR
David R. Upham*
[I]n a given State, every citizen of every other State shall have the same privileges
and immunities—that is, the same rights—which the citizens of that State possess.
–Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 608 (1860).
The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States; and shall have the right of transit and sojourn in any
State of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property; and the right of property
in said slaves shall not be thereby impaired.
–CONF. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (1861).
Resolved, That we deeply sympathize with those men who have been driven, some
from their native States and others from the States of their adoption, and are now exiled
from their homes on account of their opinions; and we hold the Democratic Party
responsible for this gross violation of that clause of the Constitution which declares that
the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States.
–Supplemental Resolution proposed by Ohio’s
Joshua Giddings and unanimously adopted by the
Republican National Convention of 1860.1
© 2016 David R. Upham.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor of Politics, University of Dallas.  J.D., University of Texas; Ph.D.,
University of Dallas.  I give special thanks to Richard Dougherty and Thomas West for their
guidance, fifteen years ago, in preparing the dissertation on which this article is partly
based.  I am also grateful to Richard Aynes, Scott Broyles, Andrew Hyman, and Earl Maltz
for their very helpful comments on drafts of this Article.
1 John Hutchins, Reminiscences of the Thirty-Sixth and Thirty-Seventh Congresses XII, 12
NAT’L MAG. 63, 69 (1890).
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Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of each State the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several States.2
INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment to our Constitution provides, in part, that
“[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States.”3  This “Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause” has been called “the darling of the professoriate.”4  Indeed, in
the last decade alone, law professors have published dozens of articles treat-
ing the provision.5
This Article proceeds from the same professorial ardor.  Still, relative to
many other treatments, this Article is both more modest and more ambitious.
On the one hand, I do not propose to offer a full account of the original
meaning of the Clause.  On the other, I do aim to help build a genuine
scholarly consensus by presenting compelling evidence that has been, for the
most part, largely overlooked by contemporary scholars.6
The focus of this particular study is the interpretation of the “privileges
and immunities of citizens” offered by American political actors, including
not only judges, but also elected officials and private citizens, before the Four-
teenth Amendment, and primarily, on the eve of the Civil War.  This study
proceeds in four parts.
First, the Article defends the relevance of this inquiry.  I am to refute the
conclusion of Justice Miller and (more recently) of Justice Thomas that the
“privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states” secured by Article
IV were generally understood to be sharply distinct from the “privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States” secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Rather, the authors of the Clause largely believed that it would
provide greater security to the privileges guaranteed in Article IV.
Second, the Article provides a brief account of the understanding of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause before 1857, concluding that the provi-
2 L.E. CHITTENDEN, A REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE SECRET SES-
SIONS OF THE CONFERENCE CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES, HELD AT WASHINGTON, D.C., IN FEBRUARY, A.D. 1861, at 473 (1864).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)
(No. 08-1521) (comment of Justice Scalia).
5 A Lexis search of articles published between 2006 and 2015 inclusively shows nearly
fifty law journal articles with titles containing the words “privileges” and “immunities,”
thirty-six of which concerned the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., David S. Bogen, Mr.
Justice Miller’s Clause: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States Internationally,
56 DRAKE L. REV. 1051 (2008); Eric R. Claeys, Blackstone’s Commentaries and the Privileges or
Immunities of United States Citizens: A Modest Tribute to Professor Siegan, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
777 (2008); Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation Through the Four-
teenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 MO. L. REV. 1 (2007).
6 Some of the evidence presented here is now much more readily available to schol-
ars, thanks to the explosive growth of scanned text, especially via Google Books and other
sources of “big data.”
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sion’s original understanding was ambiguous and generated only sporadic
(though important) national controversy and commentary.  As a result, up to
1857, the Privilege and Immunities Clause’s meaning remained largely
obscure, even among jurists.
Third, the Article explains that from 1857 to 1861, in the course of
national debates, at least three contrasting interpretations rose to substantial
public prominence: (1) a pro-slavery, absolute-rights reading; (2) an abso-
lute-rights reading endorsed by Republicans, which sometimes incorporated
claims of black citizenship; and (3) a strictly interstate-equality understand-
ing.  The prominence of the first two readings represented radical develop-
ments relative to the third reading, a reading that had prevailed in the past
and would prevail again in courts in the future.  Consequently, there arose a
substantial gap between the judiciary and the polity as a whole as to the
meaning of the constitutional privileges of citizenship.
Fourth, this Article concludes by noting the ways in which this antebel-
lum evidence illuminates both (1) the original understanding of the “privi-
leges [and] immunities of citizens of the United States”7 secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment and (2) the vulnerability of this Amendment to judi-
cial misconstruction in the Slaughter-House Cases.8
I. THE IDENTITY OF THE “PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES” SECURED BY
ARTICLE IV OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
According to Justice Miller’s majority opinion in the Slaughter-House
Cases, the privileges guaranteed by Article IV are sharply distinct from those
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment: the former involve the rights
granted and established by the laws of the respective states, while the latter
are rights created by federal law, including the Federal Constitution.9  In
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Justice Clarence Thomas, with express reliance on
the work of Professor Kurt Lash, made a comparable claim.10  If Justices
Miller and Thomas are right, a consideration of the antebellum understand-
ing of the Privileges and Immunities Clause would seem merely peripheral,
only remotely relevant to an inquiry into the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
9 Id. at 75–79 (concluding that “there is a difference between the privileges and
immunities belonging to a citizen of the United States as such, and those belonging to the
citizen of the State” and that while the former, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
are those rights that “owe their existence to the Federal government, its National charac-
ter, its Constitution, or its laws,” the latter, guaranteed by Article IV, are the privileges that
state law might “grant or establish”).
10 561 U.S. 742, 822–38 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (citing, inter alia, Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Part I: “Privileges and Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1294–96
(2010)).
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There is, however, abundant evidence that the drafters of the Amend-
ment believed that the privileges of citizenship to be protected therein were
largely identical with those already embraced by Article IV.11  As is well
known, an initial draft of the Clause, as proposed by the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, would have empowered Congress “to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several States.”12  This proposal
seemed the answer to the Senate’s resolution directing the Committee to
establish, by constitutional amendment, congressional power to enforce cer-
tain existing constitutional provisions, including the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause.13  And during Congress’s deliberations over the Amendment, a
leading drafter and proponent, Ohio Congressman John Bingham,
explained that Article IV protected the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States,14 an interpretation he had offered at least twice in Con-
gress during the previous decade.15  Several other participants also equated
these privileges, including fellow Ohioans Samuel Shellabarger,16 William
Lawrence,17 and John Sherman,18 as well as Senators Jacob Howard and
Luke Poland, of Michigan and Vermont, respectively.19  And in the few years
following their vote for the Amendment, both Bingham and Howard reiter-
11 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 834 (noting that “much ambiguity derives from the fact that
at least several Members described § 1 as protecting the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens ‘in the several States,’ harkening back to Article IV, § 2”).
12 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866).
13 S. JOURNAL, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1866).
14 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866).
15 See Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revis-
ited, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 11, 18 (1968) (discussing the District of Columbia Emancipa-
tion Bill in 1862 and an Oregon bill in 1859); see also APPENDIX TO THE CONG. GLOBE, 36th
Cong., 2d Sess., 80 (1861) (Congressman Bingham declaring that “every citizen of the
Republic, whether native or adopted, and into every part of which, under the Constitution
. . . has the right to go, and there enjoy all the privileges and immunities of an American
citizen, without let or hindrance from any local State government, or from any secession
convention or lawless mob”).  Bingham opposed an initial draft of West Virginia’s pro-
posed constitution because its blanket prohibition on black immigration threatened,
according to a proposal he helped draft, to exclude the “citizen[s] of either of the States of
this Union” from the “privileges or immunities to which the said citizen[s] [are] entitled
by the Constitution of the United States.” The New State, DAILY INTELLIGENCER (July 15,
1862), http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84026845/1862-07-15/ed-1/seq-2/.
Congress eventually voted to admit West Virginia on the condition that the anti-black-
immigration provision be removed from the Constitution and be replaced with a provision
for gradual emancipation. J.N. BRENAMAN, A HISTORY OF VIRGINIA CONVENTIONS 66 (1902).
16 See Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 119–20 (2011).
17 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866).
18 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865) (stating that under Article IV, § 2, “a
citizen of one State had the right to go anywhere within the United States and exercise the
immunity of a citizen of the United States”).
19 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (indicating Howard’s belief that the
“privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” included the “privileges and
immunities of citizens of each of the States in the several States” guaranteed by Article IV);
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ated the equivalence between Article IV privileges and the privileges of U.S.
citizenship.20  In sum, as David Bogen has concluded, “[t]he debates leave no
room for doubt that the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment referred to the same privileges and immunities as Article IV,”
for “[e]very speaker” that discussed the relationship between the clauses
“stated that the Fourteenth Amendment clause was derived from Article
IV.”21
Further, during the ratification debates, supporters said flatly that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was “intended for the enforcement of [the
Privileges and Immunities Clause].”22  As James Bond has noted in his exten-
sive surveys of the ratification debates, supporters of ratification (at least in
the South) never stated nor even “implied that Section 1 guaranteed only
those privileges and immunities peculiar to national citizenship, in contra-
distinction to [privileges] peculiar to state citizenship.”23  These privileges
were already in the Constitution, to be sure, but in Article IV.24
The identification of Article IV rights as privileges of American citizen-
ship was not idiosyncratic or novel to the Reconstruction era.  Many leading
antebellum Americans, of various parties, identified Article IV’s privileges as
the “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” or some vari-
ant thereof.  During the 1858 Senate campaign, for instance, Abraham Lin-
coln called these privileges the “rights of a citizen of the United States,”25
while Stephen Douglas labeled them the “rights and privileges awarded to
id. at 2961 (including Poland’s claim that the Privileges or Immunities Clause “secures
nothing beyond” the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
20 CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 36
n.17, 56–57 (2015) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 450 (1867); CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1003 (1869)); see also Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 78–79 (1993).
21 DAVID SKILLEN BOGEN, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 51 (2003).
22 Madison, Letter to the Editor, The Proposed Constitutional Amendment—What It Pro-
vides, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1866, at 2; see also Madison, Letter to the Editor, The Constitu-
tional Amendments—National Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1866, at 2 (presenting the
Corfield list of privileges as exemplars of “the long-defined rights of a citizen of the United
States, with which States cannot constitutionally interfere” but had been “denied to the
whole class, on account of color, and illy secured to all [citizens] in certain sections”).
23 JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 256–57 (1997).
24 James E. Bond, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. REV. 435, 450 (1985).  Christopher Green’s recent survey
yielded similar conclusions. See GREEN, supra note 20, at 52–55.  For contemporaneous
judicial authority, see United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 789 (Swayne, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151) (calling the rights secured by Article IV of the Confedera-
tion as “the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the United States”), and Smith v.
Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 305 (1866) (identifying Article IV privileges as “the privileges and
immunities of general citizenship of the United States”).
25 Abraham Lincoln, Seventh and Last Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Alton, Ill.
(Oct. 15, 1858), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 283, 299 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1953).
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citizens of the United States.”26  A year later, Virginia’s governor Henry Wise
reassured a Massachusetts abolitionist that she had a right to travel in Vir-
ginia because Article IV “guaranties to you the privileges and immunities of a
citizen of the United States in the State of Virginia” including the right to
travel “for any lawful and peaceful purpose.”27
Some antebellum jurists used similar language to explain the Clause.
One authority was Charles O’Conor, one of the most celebrated attorneys in
New York (and future presidential candidate and counsel for Jefferson
Davis).28  Having been hired by the Virginia legislature to defend the inter-
ests of a Virginia slaveowner sojourning in New York,29 O’Conor argued that
the Clause protected “the privileges of citizens of the United States”—that is,
not “the privileges of citizens of the particular State in which they are wayfar-
ers, or of the State in which they are domiciled, but the general privileges of
a citizen of the United States.”30  In Dred Scott v. Sandford, both Chief Justice
Taney and Justice Nelson suggested a similar reading.31
Other prominent northern jurists likewise affirmed that Article IV
secured the privileges of national citizenship.  While Congress was drafting
the Fourteenth Amendment, Indiana’s Supreme Court followed Justice Cur-
tis’s dissent in Dred Scott32 by calling these rights the “privileges and immuni-
ties of general citizenship of the United States.”33  Perhaps most notably, two
decades earlier, Justice Nathaniel Reed, of Ohio’s Supreme Court, had inter-
preted the Clause to read as follows: “That ‘the citizens (of the United States)
of each State,’ or belonging to each State, ‘shall be entitled to all the privi-
26 Stephen Douglas, Speech at Bloomington, in LIFE OF STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS, TO
WHICH ARE ADDED HIS SPEECHES AND REPORTS 120 (H.M. Flint ed., 1863) (speech delivered
on July 16, 1858).
27 Reply of Governor Wise to Lydia Maria Child (Oct. 29, 1859), in LETTERS OF LYDIA
MARIA CHILD 105 (John G. Whittier ed., 1882).
28 3 THE NATIONAL CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 387 (1893).
29 N.Y. COURT OF APPEALS, REPORT OF THE LEMMON SLAVE CASE 15 (1860).
30 Id. at 44 (opening argument of Mr. O’Conor).  In response, William Evarts (future
Republican Attorney General of the United States) contested this distinction: “the natural
and necessary construction of the clause is, that the privileges and immunities secured to
citizens of each State, while within another, are the privileges and immunities that citizens
of the State, where such privileges and immunities shall need to be claimed, enjoy,” or in
other words “the privileges and immunities (whatever they may be) accorded in each to its
own citizens.” Id. at 78 (argument of Mr. Evarts for Respondents).  For antebellum judicial
authorities suggesting that the Clause protected the rights of U.S. citizenship, see Douglass’
Administrator v. Stevens, 2 Del. Cas. 489, 502 (1819), and Murray v. M’Carty, 16 Va. (2 Munf.)
393, 398 (1811).
31 60 U.S. 393, 425 (1857) (stating that if a free black person had been a “citizen”
under Article IV, “he might have visited and sojourned in Maryland when he pleased, and
as long as he pleased, as a citizen of the United States” (emphasis added)); id. at 468 (Nelson,
J., concurring) (raising the possible “right of the master with his slave of transit into or
through a free State . . . being a citizen of the United States, which is not before us” which
issue “turns upon the rights and privileges secured to a common citizen of the republic”).
32 Id. at 576 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
33 Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 305 (1866).
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leges and immunities of citizens (of the United States) in the several
States.’”34  According to Reed, the Clause protected certain national privi-
leges throughout the Union: “the spirit and intention” of the Clause is “not
to secure to the non-resident the same rights and indulgence with the resi-
dent in every State, but simply to secure to the citizen of the United States,
whether a State resident or not, the full enjoyment of all the rights of citizen-
ship, in every State throughout the Union.”35  Not surprisingly, it was
Ohioans in Congress who two decades later would most prominently endorse
this “ellipsis” reading.36
For antebellum authorities, the Privileges and Immunities Clause pro-
tected the rights of “United States” citizenship in at least two ways.  First,
some explained that the Clause established a national status by naturalizing
the citizens of each state in all the others.37  Second, some thought the
Clause secured national privileges because citizens of each of the states did
enjoy them, and/or should enjoy them, in all the states of the Union.38  This
latter definition excluded those privileges of citizenship, such as political
rights, that the states properly reserved to their own citizens—the privileges
of state citizenship.39  The qualifier “of the United States,” then, served to
clarify that the Clause did not secure all the privileges of citizenship, but only
those of national extent.
In none of these ways did the word “United States” refer to the govern-
ment of the United States as a creator of rights.  As both the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution indicate, the sovereign citizenry of the
United States is a creator, not a creature, of the central government of the
“United States.”40  The citizens of the United States, armed with their privi-
leges, created the (mere) government of the United States.  Justice Miller,
however, reversed this relationship41 by effectively reading “privileges . . . of
citizens of the United States” as the “privileges created by the government of
the United States.”
34 Wm. H. Williams, The Arrest of Non-Residents for Debt—Constitutionality of the Law, 2
WESTERN L.J. 265, 266 (1844).
35 Id. at 267.
36 See supra notes 16–19.
37 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (reporting Senator Howard’s expla-
nation that Article IV’s effect “was to constitute ipso facto the citizens of each one of the
original States citizens of the United States”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008).
38 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (reporting Senator Howard’s iden-
tification of these rights as “the privileges and immunities of citizens of each of the States
in the several States”).
39 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 422 (1857).
40 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (indicating that even before
independence, the American people were “one People”); id. para. 32 (stating that the
signatories are the representatives of “the good People of these Colonies”); U.S. CONST.
pmbl.
41 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16. Wall.) 36, 79 (1873) (defining these rights as
those that “owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Con-
stitution, or its laws”).
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To support Miller’s contra-textual distinction, Justice Thomas pointed to
the antebellum treaties in which the United States pledged to admit the
inhabitants of the ceded Louisiana, Florida, and Mexican territories to the
privileges of citizens of the United States.42  According to Thomas, these ter-
ritorial provisions were generally thought to protect certain privileges arising
under national, not state law, including the rights enumerated in the federal
Bill of Rights, as distinct from the state-conferred privileges protected in Arti-
cle IV.  These national rights, they argue, were the privileges of citizenship to
be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.43
The major problem with this reading is twofold.  First, there is little to
no direct evidence that anyone involved in the adoption of the Amendment
understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause in this way.  That is to say,
there is scant record of anyone drawing a connection with the territorial
rights, let alone elaborating that the Amendment would turn the treaty rights,
secured in only some territories, into constitutional rights, guaranteed in all the
states.44
Second, this interpretation of the treaties is starkly inconsistent with the
predominant antebellum interpretations.  The original intent of the Louisi-
ana and Florida treaties was to ensure that the inhabitants would not remain
indefinitely in a subordinate status, but enjoy admission as citizens of an
42 Treaty with France for the Cession of Louisiana, U.S.-Fr., art. III, Apr. 30, 1803, 18
Stat. 232, 233 (“The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union
of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the
Federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of
citizens of the United States . . . .”); Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits Between the
United States of America and His Catholic Majesty, U.S.-Spain, art. VI, Feb. 22, 1819, 18
Stat. 712, 714 (“The inhabitants of the territories which His Catholic Majesty cedes to the
United States, by this treaty, shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, as
soon as may be consistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution, and admitted to
the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United
States.”); Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico,
U.S.-Mex., art. IX, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, 930 (“Mexicans who, in the territories afore-
said, shall not preserve the character of citizens of the Mexican republic, conformably with
what is stipulated in the preceding article, shall be incorporated into the Union of the
United States, and be admitted at the proper time (to be judged of by the Congress of the
United States) to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States, according
to the principles of the constitution . . . .”).
43 For Justice Thomas and Professor Lash’s discussion of these treaties, see McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 823–26 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment), and KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVI-
LEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 47–66, 285–98 (2014).  For the earliest
scholarly notice of the relevance of these treaties to the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Arnold T. Guminski, The Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of the American People: A Disjunctive
Theory of Selective Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 765, 783–90 (1985).
44 Professors Lash and Green cite a few connections between the Amendment and the
territorial treaties in 1866, but these related to the Citizenship Clause (or its analogue in
the Civil Rights Act) and not to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. GREEN, supra note 20,
at 24–25; LASH, supra note 43, at 142–43, 186–87.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 9 30-MAR-16 15:52
2016] the  meanings  of  privileges  and  immunities 1125
equal state of the Union.45  The Clause, then, secured the inhabitants the
collective right of “equal footing” as citizens of an equal state,46 with collec-
tive naturalization extended concurrently with statehood.47
In the four decades before the Fourteenth Amendment, this original
interpretation was significantly modified, as litigants, judges, and statesmen
increasingly insisted that the treaties granted not eventual, collective state-
hood and concomitant naturalization, but immediate, pre-statehood rights,
including the enjoyment of the status and rights of citizenship.48  The trea-
ties were increasingly read to admit individuals to certain privileges of citizen-
ship—and these were to be enjoyed before and even after statehood.  By
implication, the treaties did not promise “equal footing” but subjected the
states formed from these territories to special, unequal restrictions.
In identifying these individual rights, authorities did not generally distin-
guish them from Article IV privileges.  Rather, the rights mentioned were
largely identical.  According to various antebellum authorities, these privi-
45 Secretary of State James Madison, who helped draft the Louisiana treaty, aimed
“[t]o incorporate the inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory with the citizens of the
United States on an equal footing,” that is to “constitut[e] them a regular and integral
portion of the union.” EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1803–1812, at 66 (1920).  Congressman John Quincy Adams, who
had helped draft the “Adams-Onis Treaty” (Florida) that bears his name, acknowledged
that by force of the similarly worded Louisiana treaty, Arkansas was “entitled to admission
as a slave State, as Louisiana and Mississippi, and Alabama, and Missouri, have been admit-
ted, [for it] is written in the bond, and, however I may lament that it ever was so written, I
must faithfully perform its obligations.”  12 CONG. DEB., 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 4681 (1836).
His Spanish counterparts plainly had a similar understanding of the Florida treaty, for by
the Spanish version, the inhabitants were promised admission “al goce de todos los
privilegios, derechos e´ inmunidades de que disfrutan los ciudadanos de los demas Estados,”
that is in English, admitted “to enjoy all the privileges, rights and immunities enjoyed by
citizens of other States.” D. LUIS DE ONI´S, MEMORIA SOBRE LAS NEGOCIACIONES ENTRE ESPAN˜A
Y LOS ESTADOS-UNIDOS DE AMERICA, QUE DIERON MOTIVO AL TRATADO DE 1819, at 10 (1820)
(emphasis added); see also City of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 224, 235
(1835) (finding that the treaty provision was intended to ensure “that Louisiana shall be
admitted into the union as soon as possible, upon an equal footing with the other states”).
46 De Armas, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 235; see also Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 559 (1911)
(setting forth this doctrine with respect to all states of the Union).
47 See United States v. Laverty, 26 F. Cas. 875, 876–77 (D. La. 1812) (No. 15,569);
Judson v. Eslava, 1 Minor 2, 3 (Ala. 1820) (concluding that the treaty “does not secure
Citizenship until the inhabitants are incorporated into the Union” so an alien residing in
the Louisiana territory at the time of the cession but absent at the time of statehood was
not a citizen by force of the treaty); Durnford v. Johnson, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 183, 201–02 (La.
1812); see also Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 170 (1892) (holding that “in
the admission of a State a collective naturalization may be effected”).
48 Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) (stating that the treaty
“admits the inhabitants of Florida to the enjoyment of the privileges, rights, and immuni-
ties, of the citizens of the United States”); State v. Primrose, 3 Ala. 546, 549 (1842) (stating
that there could be “no doubt” that the treaty itself immediately “created citizens of the
United States”).
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leges included the right to acquire real as well as personal property,49 the
immunity against arbitrarily discriminatory taxation and other unequal bur-
dens on property—including discriminations based on race and national ori-
gin50—and that equal protection and due process necessary to the equal
enjoyment of these economic privileges.51  These rights may have also
49 Tannis v. Doe, 21 Ala. 449, 455 (1852) (mentioning the right “to hold lands in the
United States”); United States v. Lucero, 1 N.M. 422, 434 (1869) (mentioning the right of
Indians “to hold, purchase, or convey property as citizens and as men, without having to
ask the sanction of any department of the government”); Ward v. Broadwell, 1 N.M. 75, 85
(1854) (identifying “the power of enjoying and acquiring property, of exercising the pater-
nal and marital powers and the like”); B.F. Flanders, Chairman, Address of the State
Republican Convention to the People of Louisiana (Sept. 25, 1865), in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONVENTION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF LOUISIANA 20 (1865) (including the right to
engage in “every trade and pursuit”); cf. United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. 525, 535–39
(1855) (indicating that the “privileges of citizenship” included the right to take and hold
real property).
50 People v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 232, 242, 250–51 (1850) (upholding a special mining tax
imposed on aliens and indicating that both the treaty and Article IV might prohibit such a
tax on citizens naturalized under the Treaty); United States v. Santistevan, 1 N.M. 583, 591
(1874) (affirming that the treaty entitled former Mexican citizens to “the same rights of
property as are enjoyed by all citizens of the United States”); JAMES MCKAYE, THE MASTER-
SHIP AND ITS FRUITS 13 (1864) (noting that under the treaty, “the free colored people of
Louisiana have always held, and do now claim, that the government of the United States
was solemnly bound to secure to them ‘all the rights, advantages, and immunities’ that
were justly due to any other free inhabitants of the ceded territory” including “political and
many civil rights and immunities”); Flanders, supra note 49, at 19–20 (declaring that “[t]he
repressive influence of slaves prevented the full application of this article [of the Louisiana
treaty]” and indicating that these rights included the right to testify in all civil and criminal
cases, and the right to engage in “every trade and pursuit”). But see Lodano v. State, 25 Ala.
64, 65–67 (1854) (implicitly rejecting defendant counsel’s argument that by the Louisiana
treaty, free black inhabitants had the same right as white inhabitants to buy and sell alco-
hol); Tannis, 21 Ala. at 455 (stating that a free black woman, naturalized under the treaty,
would be entitled to the right to acquire property, “if not incapacitated by the laws of the State
in which the lands were situated,” thus suggesting the validity of state laws imposing racial
disabilities (emphasis added)).
51 Les Bois v. Bramell, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 449, 459 (1846) (acknowledging that the
promise of admission to the rights of U.S. citizenship “implied, that after their admission
they should be equally protected” (emphasis added)); Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 376, 403 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (affirming that the former
aliens had “the same constitutional right to invoke the protection of the judicial power of the
state or Union, against the invasion of his rights of person or property, wherever he might
be located” and asking rhetorically, “can the inhabitants enjoy the rights, privileges, and
immunities of American citizens, if the United States can confiscate their lands, by declar-
ing their titles void, and granting them to others; and could this be done after their incor-
poration?” (emphasis added)); Delassus v. United States, 34 U.S. 117, 133 (1835)
(including “the perfect inviolability and security of property”); Minturn v. Brower, 24 Cal.
644, 660 (1864) (affirming that by the treaty “Mexicans then established in California, and
having property therein, should retain and enjoy it or dispose of it as to them might seem
proper” and assuming this guaranty applied to a post-statehood claim of former Mexicans
naturalized by the treaty); Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 589, 620 (1858) (indicating former
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encompassed the right to vote (and other political rights) without regard to
race.52
These rights, including the possible enjoyment of political rights, were
largely identical to the enumerated privileges set forth in that most famous
antebellum exposition of the Privileges and Immunities Clause—Corfield v.
Coryell.53  Therefore, in general, in the decades before the Civil War, there
was largely a convergence in the interpretations of the respective “privileges
and immunities” secured by the treaties and Article IV (according to
Corfield).
II. “THAT [LARGELY] UNEXPLORED CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION”
A. Original Purpose and Early Interpretations—The Founders’ Consensus
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution (and its ana-
logue in the Articles of Confederation) generated little commentary during
the Founding era.54  This silence probably resulted from the conservative,
and thus uncontroversial, nature of the measure.  Upon independence, the
lack of a common king, empire, and subjecthood had threatened to make
the former fellow-subjects effectively aliens vis-a`-vis one another.  The princi-
pal motive for the Clause was to ensure that despite the mutual indepen-
dence of the states, the citizens of each would still enjoy a general citizenship
throughout the Union—the former British North America.55
One question left largely unanswered was whether the standard of citi-
zenship would be national or peculiar to each state.  The Clause did not spec-
ify whether the privileges of citizenship were to be identified and/or defined
with reference to a state, national, or other standard.
As I have previously noted, the early court decisions supported at least
three different interpretations: (1) an interstate-equality guaranty by which a
citizen of one state was entitled in the other states to an immunity against
Mexican citizens “are entitled to the same protection in their property which is afforded to
other citizens of the United States”).
52 Carter v. Territory, 1 N.M. 317, 340–46 (1859) (noting that a Mexican-born citizen
was an eligible juror by force of the treaty).  For extrajudicial evidence, see MCKAYE, supra
note 50, at 13, Flanders, supra note 49, at 18–20 (suggesting that the rights of U.S. citizen-
ship included an immunity from racial discrimination with regard to judicial and electoral
rights), and CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 286 (1865) (remarks of Pennsylvania Rep.
Kelley, arguing for black suffrage in the reconstructed South, in part, by citing the treaty,
and noting that full citizenship, including equal voting rights, was required by the “solemn
obligations assumed by the executive department of the national Government in the exer-
cise of the treaty-making power”).
53 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
54 For an extensive study of the limited Founding-era evidence, see David R. Upham,
Protecting the Privileges of Citizenship: Founding, Civil War, and Reconstruction, in CHAL-
LENGES TO THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: SLAVERY, HISTORICISM, AND PROGRESSIVISM IN THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY 139 (Ronald J. Pestritto & Thomas G. West eds., 2005).
55 David R. Upham, Note, Corfield v. Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of Ameri-
can Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2005).
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interstate discrimination; (2) an entitlement to certain national privileges of
citizenship—primarily those travel and economic privileges enumerated in
Corfield; and (3) an entitlement to certain privileges against adverse federal
action.56  The first position is largely identical to the interpretation that has
prevailed at least since the Slaughter-House Cases.57
Still, in the first three decades of the Constitution, jurists appeared
largely unconcerned by the possible tensions between these positions.  The
reason for this insouciance is probably, as Earl Maltz has indicated, that the
Founders expected the several states, in their local laws, to accord their own
citizens the same set of fundamental rights: “the idea of a state government
failing to provide its own citizens generally with the rights discussed in
Corfield was almost unthinkable.”58  That is to say, there would likely be little
distinction between the privileges of citizens of the United States and those of
citizens in the respective states.
Indeed, at the risk of overstatement, it could be fairly said that at the
founding, a general consensus as to the rights of humanity and citizenship
prevailed, as evidenced in the state constitutions, the common law, and the
Declaration of Independence—what Jefferson called an “expression of the
American mind”—and of the “harmonizing sentiments of the day.”59  During
the ratification debates, both Federalists and Anti-Federalists celebrated this
American consensus.60  As James Wilson later remarked, the Constitution
aimed not at “precise and exact uniformity in all [the states’] particular estab-
lishments and laws.  It is sufficient that the fundamental principles of their
laws and constitutions be consistent and congenial; and that some general
rights and privileges should be diffused indiscriminately among them.”61  As
long as this consensus endured, a common standard of citizenship, including
56 Id. at 1498–510.
57 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872) (“Its sole purpose was to declare to the several
States, that whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as
you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor
less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.”
(emphasis added)).
58 EARL M. MALTZ, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
34 (2003).
59 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 407, 407 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854).
60 THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 15 (John Jay) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008) (remarking
that Americans are “one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors,
speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles
of government, very similar in their manners and customs”); R.H. Lee, Essentials of a Free
Government, in LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 10, 11 (Walter Hart-
well Bennett ed., 1978) (contending that the peoples of the several states have “derived all
these rights from one common source, the British systems; and hav[e] in the formation of
their state constitutions, discovered that their ideas relative to these rights are very
similar”).
61 JAMES WILSON, Of Man, as a Member of a Confederation, in 1 THE WORKS OF THE
HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 319, 351 (Bird Wilson ed., 1804).
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its privileges, would prevail across the several states without major
controversy.
B. Emerging Strains to the Consensus
But the Founders’ consensus was fraught with ambiguities resulting from
the institution of slavery.  These ambiguities gave rise to multiple controver-
sies; some involved the interstate privileges of citizenship under our national
Constitution.  As the historian Albert Hart noted a century ago, two questions
emerged as the northern states abolished slavery.  First, “did the clause on
‘privileges and immunities of citizens’ give a master a right to carry his slaves
into another state?”  Second, “[d]id it give negro citizens in one state the
right to go into another state?”62  Further, in the 1830s, a third controversy
emerged as northern antislavery speech became more strident and southern
proslavery citizens became less tolerant: Did the Clause allow antislavery citi-
zens the right to travel in the slaveholding states and even communicate their
opinions therein?  These three questions would forcibly awaken the dormant
issue of whether the standard of “privileges and immunities” would be
national or local.
1. Right of Slave Transit and Sojourning Slaveholders
In the first half of the nineteenth century, some traveling slaveholders
sought judicial relief against increasingly intolerant northern antislavery laws.
One constitutional argument was that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
secured to sojourning slaveholders a right to travel with their slaves and thus
an exemption from local antislavery law.  The argument itself was remarkable
in its novelty, given that the Framers of the Constitution had deliberately
omitted such constitutional protection.63  Even more remarkable was the
argument’s success.  Before the 1850s, the supreme courts of Virginia,64 Mis-
souri,65 and even Illinois66 endorsed this reading of the Clause.  In contrast,
the high courts of both Massachusetts and Connecticut impliedly concluded
62 16 ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, THE AMERICAN NATION, 1831–1841, at 276–77 (1906).
63 See HENRY SHERMAN, SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (1858) (noting
that the latter clause of Article IV of the Confederation, omitted from the Constitution of
1787, “was evidently intended to protect the owner[ ] of slave property as well as ordinary
merchandise, in transitu from the port of entry in one state to the place of ownership in
another”); Upham, supra note 54, at 139, 146.
64 Lewis v. Fullerton, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 15, 22 (1821), superseded by constitutional amend-
ment, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
65 Julia v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 270, 272 (1833), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amends. XIII, XIV (“The 2d section of the 4th article of the Constitution of the
United States says that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States.  We are of opinion that it is the undoubted
right of every citizen of the United States to pass freely through every other State with his
property of every description, including negro slaves, without being in any way subject to
forfeit his property for having done so, provided he does not subject his property by a
residence to the action of the laws of the State in which he may so reside.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 14 30-MAR-16 15:52
1130 notre dame law review [vol. 91:3
otherwise.67  But outside the courts, the asserted right of slave transit seems
to have generated little discussion before 1850.
2. Right of Free Blacks to Enjoy the Privileges of Travel, Residence, Etc.
At the same time, Americans were growing sharply divided as to whether
the freedmen (and their offspring) were citizens, and if so, what rights such
citizens must enjoy under Article IV.  While native-born free persons were
entitled to citizenship by force of the common law,68 here as elsewhere,
racial prejudice overrode traditional principle.69  Many states, especially in
the South and Midwest, restricted the right of free blacks to travel,70 to
reside,71 to acquire property,72 to bear arms,73 and to vote—and even to
enjoy that basic protection of the laws secured by the rights to file suit74 and
to testify.75
66 Willard v. People, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 461, 472 (1843) (affirming that by comity and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, citizens from other states have “a right of passage
through the territory of another, peaceably for business or pleasure, and that too without
the latter’s acquiring any right over the person or property,” including property in slaves
(citing M. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 269–70, Bk. II, §§ 107–09 (Luke White trans.,
1792))).
67 Without specifically mentioning the Clause, the courts asserted broadly that nothing
in the Constitution gave any such right to sojourners.  Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, 40,
53 (1837); Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 224 (1836).  For a good discus-
sion of some of these cases, see PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERAL-
ISM, AND COMITY 70–180 (Morris S. Arnold ed., 1981).
68 JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, at
287–88 (1978).
69 Id. at 288, 311–33.
70 On southern laws prohibiting the travel of free blacks, see for example Paul
Finkelman, When International Law Was a Domestic Problem, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 779, 806–812
(2010), and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416–17 (1857) (referring to the
“the special laws and from the police regulations” governing free blacks’ travel that the
slaveholding states “considered to be necessary for their own safety”).
71 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1865–73 (1993) (detailing southern and midwestern laws prohibiting
black immigration).  For cases upholding such laws, see for example State v. Cooper, 5
Blackf. 258 (Ind. 1839) (upholding Indiana’s exclusionary law), and Nelson v. People, 33 Ill.
390 (1864).
72 OR. CONST. art. I, § 35 (1859) (repealed Nov. 2, 1926) (prohibiting out-of-state free
blacks from holding real estate).
73 Several cases affirm these statutes. See Clayton E. Cramer et al., “This Right Is Not
Allowed by Governments That Are Afraid of the People”: The Public Meaning of the Second Amend-
ment When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 823, 831–33 (2010)
(citing Cooper v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 4 Ga. 68 (1848); State v. Newsom, 27
N.C. (5 Ired.) 250 (1844)).
74 Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 (1822) (upholding Kentucky’s law restricting
blacks’ right to file certain lawsuits).
75 At least five northern states—Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and California—adopted
antebellum laws prohibiting blacks from testifying in cases involving whites. LEON F.
LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY, 1790–1860, at 93–94 (1961); see also In re Dorsey (E.D. Va.
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Not surprisingly, courts in states enforcing such laws uniformly rejected
the claims of free blacks, principally on the grounds that such persons were
not citizens under the Constitution.76  But an alternative argument was fre-
quently made: even if they were citizens, free blacks were entitled only to
interstate equality and not interracial equality or any other rights; that is, visit-
ing free blacks were entitled to no exemption from local racist laws, but only
to be treated as well, or as badly, as native, local free blacks.77  In dicta, how-
ever, at least two northeastern courts tacitly disputed this strict interstate-
equality reading.78
Unlike slave transit, black citizenship was a matter of prominent political
controversy well before the 1850s.  The three principal occasions for substan-
tial debate were (1) the 1820 debates over the admission of Missouri under a
state constitution that excluded free blacks, (2) the efforts in the 1840s by
Massachusetts citizens and legislators to challenge the laws of South Carolina
and Louisiana that prohibited the entry of free black seamen, and (3) the
1864), decision reprinted in EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, DURING THE GREAT REBELLION app. 442, 442–43 (2d ed. 1865) (invali-
dating Virginia’s law).
76 See, e.g., Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509, 511 (1846) (upholding a law prohibiting the
migration of free blacks); Roberts v. Commonwealth (C.C. Ky. 1848), in 74 NILES’ NAT’L
REG. 248, 248–50 (1848) (reaching the same holding and citing, inter alia, State v. Cooper, 5
Blackf. 258, which upheld Indiana’s law).
77 Costin v. Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613–14 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3266); Wiley v.
Parmer, 14 Ala. 627, 631 (1848) (citing Amy and other cases to conclude that visiting citi-
zens are entitled to the privileges enjoyed by local citizens only “under the like circum-
stances”); Amy, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) at 335 (holding that because a law prohibiting blacks from
filing certain lawsuits “operates as well upon citizens of this state, as upon those of any
other, it cannot be a violation of the clause of the constitution in question”); Leech v.
Cooley, 14 Miss. (6 S. & M.) 93, 99 (1846); State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (1 Meigs) 331, 340
(1838) (holding that a newly resident free black was entitled only to the “‘privileges and
immunities’ which free negroes” enjoy in Tennessee, and by the law of Tennessee, native-
born emancipated slaves “are required to leave the State”). But see Amy, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) at
344–45 (Mills, J., dissenting); Roberts, 74 NILES’ NAT’L REG. at 249 (1848) (suggesting that if
free blacks were citizens the Clause guaranteed certain absolute “civil rights,” including the
“[t]he rights of personal security and property”).
78 The Cynosure, 6 F. Cas. 1102, 1103, 1103 n.3 (D. Mass. 1844) (No. 3529) (stating
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was “wholly ignored” by a Louisiana law that
prohibited any “free negro, mulatto or person of color [from coming] into this state on
board of any vessel or steamboat” (quoting 7 LAW REPORTER 227–28 (Peleg W. Chandler
ed., 1845))); Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 560 (Pa. 1837) (arguing against the full political
citizenship of free blacks in Pennsylvania, because to confer such citizenship, would “over-
bear the laws imposing countless disabilities on him in other states,” with apparent refer-
ence to the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Douglas G. Smith, The Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2: Precursor of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 34
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 892 n.268 (1997) (discussing The Cynosure); see also Editorial,
Remarks on the Opinion of the Supreme Court on the Rights of Coloured Persons in
Relation to Suffrage, 11 THE FRIEND 210, 220 (1838) (claiming that the Hobbs decision is
“humiliating to a Pennsylvanian [for] we are not at liberty to adjust the rights of citizenship
among ourselves without being limited and restrained by the slaveholding legislatures of
the south” who deny to local free blacks “the rights which citizenship confers”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 16 30-MAR-16 15:52
1132 notre dame law review [vol. 91:3
debates in midwestern and western states of the 1840s and 1850s over propos-
als to restrict the immigration and commerce of free blacks.79
For the most part, advocates of black citizenship asserted or assumed
that such laws violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause on the grounds
that free blacks, as bona fide citizens, were constitutionally entitled to the
privilege of travel, residence, commerce, etc.80  These advocates rejected or
conspicuously ignored the strict interstate-equality reading, even though some
of the challenged laws (such as laws discriminating against migrating free
blacks only) could have been challenged on that basis alone.81  Friends of
black citizens’ rights were apparently unwilling to rely on the generosity that
a state might show its own resident free blacks.  As early as the 1820 Missouri
debates (as in subsequent court cases), southern authorities had expressly
invoked the right to expel free blacks in defense of the right of exclusion.82
Racist public opinion in western states would surely have withheld such gen-
erosity to locals if the price were more black immigration.83  Rather, propo-
nents insisted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed
absolutely the rights of travel, residence, commerce, and perhaps to enjoy
some other rights as well—state laws to the contrary notwithstanding.84
79 For a good discussion of the Missouri Compromise debates concerning the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, see Lewis H. LaRue, Liberty, Equality, Privileges, Immunities:
Lost Knowledge 12–26 (Wash. & Lee Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Work-
ing Paper No. 00-4, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=247655.  For
debates over Ohio’s black laws and their alleged violation of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, see the legislative debates compiled in STEPHEN MIDDLETON, THE BLACK LAWS IN
THE OLD NORTHWEST 49, 59–61 (1993).  As to Massachusetts’s objections, see infra text
accompanying notes 87–89.
80 See infra subsection II.B.3
81 See infra Section III.D. But see REPORT OF THE ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL IN THE CASE
OF PRUDENCE CRANDALL, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, CRANDALL VS. STATE OF CONNECTICUT (1834)
(argument of William W. Ellsworth) (“[I]f citizens [of another state], then by the constitu-
tion of the U. States they are entitled to ‘all the immunities and privileges of the citizens of
Connecticut,’ under like circumstances.  I might say, perhaps, any citizens, but I have no
occasion to ask for more than is in this state allowed to our colored population . . . .” (empha-
sis added)).
82 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 549 (1820) (statement of Rep. Barbour of Virginia) (“Has not
Missouri a right to send off beyond her limits persons of color when free?  Virginia has
done it, and Missouri must have the same right as Virginia.  And here Mr. B. repeated his
question, had Missouri a power to get rid of all the free people of color now there, and yet
not the power to prevent others from going there?”); see also supra note 50.
83 In the nineteenth century, slaveholding states became increasingly intolerant of the
resident free-black population, and some western states gave serious consideration to pro-
posals to expel the resident black population.
84 At times, some even argued that the Clause prohibited racial discrimination with
respect to the suffrage, at least as applied to migrating black citizens. See, e.g., GEORGE H.
MOORE, NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN MASSACHUSETTS 186 (1866) (noting that as
early as 1778, Reverend William Gordon argued that “to exclude freemen from voting . . .
for the colour of their skin[ ] . . . militates with the proposal in the Confederation, that the
free inhabitants of each State shall, upon removing into any other State, enjoy all the privi-
leges and immunities belonging to the free citizens of such State” (quoting William
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In contrast, southern politicians, like southern courts, frequently
invoked the interstate-equality, or in pari conditione, reading.  The most prom-
inent instance of this argument occurred in the 1840s, during the heated
dispute over the “negro seamen acts.”  By South Carolina’s law, for instance,
free blacks found on board were subject to detention in local jails until the
ship’s departure, and even to be sold as slaves if the shipowner failed to pay
the expense of the detention.85
Controversial among some abolitionists since the 1820s, these laws gen-
erated national debate in the 1840s when Massachusetts leaders sought fed-
eral relief.  In 1841, 150 prominent “citizens of the United States” from
Massachusetts (including future Justice Benjamin Curtis86), petitioned Con-
gress for action, and to “render effectual in their behalf the privileges of
citizenship secured by the Constitution.”87  In response, a majority of a
House committee declared “no hesitation in agreeing with the memorialists,
that the acts of which they complain, are violations of the privileges of citizen-
ship guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States,” for “what may be
the precise interpretation given to this clause of the Constitution” and
“[h]owever extended or however limited may be the privileges and immuni-
ties which it secures, the citizens of each State are entitled to them equally,
without discrimination of color or condition.”88  In other words, the Clause
prohibited, at least to some extent, interracial discrimination and not merely
interstate discrimination.  Still, the Committee concluded that Congress had
no authority to provide that effective relief that could be found only in the
courts or in the southern state legislatures.89
The minority report, however, authored by North Carolina’s Kenneth
Rayner, reflected the southern opinion that even if free blacks could be citi-
zens, each state “is bound to extend to the citizens of each and every state
[only] the same privileges and immunities she extends to her own ‘under
Gordon, To the Convention of the Massachusetts-Bay, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Jan. 8, 1778, at
1)); REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF 1821, ASSEMBLED
FOR THE PURPOSE OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 184–97
(Albany, E. & E. Hosford 1821) (reporting discussion by James Kent and others that racial
discrimination as to voting rights might violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
85 Act of Dec. 20, 1822 and Act of Dec. 20, 1823, in 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA 461–66 (David J. McCord ed., 1840).
86 AUSTIN ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE DRED SCOTT CASE 170 (Paul Finkelman et al. eds.,
2006) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 27-80, at 7–8 (1849); Carl B. Swisher, The Taney Period, in 5
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 238–40, 628 (1974); Earl M. Maltz,
The Unlikely Hero of Dred Scott: Benjamin Robbins Curtis and the Constitutional Law of Slavery,
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1995 (1996)).  This position seems inconsistent with the interstate-
equality reading later endorsed by Justice Curtis. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 583–84 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
87 ROBERT C. WINTHROP, The Imprisonment of Free Colored Seamen, in ADDRESSES AND
SPEECHES ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS, at 351–52 (1852).
88 Id. at 341, 343.
89 Id. at 349–50.
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like circumstances.’”90  The quotation was probably to Story’s brief explana-
tion of the Clause.91  South Carolina’s legislature made a similar claim.92
Officials from Massachusetts and some other states openly repudiated
this strictly interstate-equality reading.  In an address sent to other state legis-
latures, the Massachusetts legislature called the in-pari-conditione reading “fal-
lacious to the last degree”:
What the precise extent of those privileges are, it is unnecessary here to
inquire, so long as it must be conceded that they cover immunity from gross
wrongs.  So long as South Carolina arrogates the right of seizing, imprison-
ing, whipping and selling as slaves for life, any member of the social system
of Massachusetts, without cause assigned, hearing or trial, just so long is that
immunity referred to in the Constitution wholly set at nought.93
During the 1850 debates over the Fugitive Slave Act, the national argu-
ment over these acts resumed.  Many northerners objected that southern vio-
lations of Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, by the negro seamen
acts, had been more outrageous than any northern violation of Article IV’s
Fugitive Slave Clause.94  In response, leading Southerners again insisted that
free blacks were entitled to not more than the “privileges and immunities
90 JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 82
(1951) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 27-80 (1843)).
91 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1800, at 674–75 (1833).
92 Massachusetts cannot “challenge for them greater rights, immunities and privileges,
within our territories, than are enjoyed by persons of the same class in South-Carolina.”
JOURNAL OF THE H. OF REPS. OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 65 (1844).
93 Resolves Concerning the Treatment of Samuel Hoar by the State of South Carolina
(Mar. 31, 1845), in ACTS AND RESOLVES PASSED BY THE GENERAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS,
IN THE YEARS 1843, 1844, 1845, at 626, 633, 635 (1845).  Charles Sumner gave a more
pointed response:
It is idle to reply that free blacks, natives of South Carolina, are [equally] treated
to imprisonment and bondage.  The Constitution of the United States does not
prohibit a State from inflicting injustice upon its own citizens. . . . But a State
must not extend its injustice to the citizens of another State,” for they are entitled
to the “same ‘privileges and immunities’ as in his own State.”
Letter from Charles Sumner to Robert C. Winthrop (Feb. 9, 1843), in 2 MEMOIRS AND
LETTERS OF CHARLES SUMNER 256, 259 (Edward L. Pierce ed., 1877); see also MCPHERSON,
supra note 75, app. at 442 (“Massachusetts may with perfect propriety say to Virginia—no
matter with what wrongs, for the sake of sustaining a bloody and barbarous system, you
outrage humanity in the persons of colored men born and reared upon your own soil, I
demand of you, by the sacred guaranty of your constitutional obligations, that the hum-
blest of my citizens when a sojourner in your territory, shall be secure in all the great
fundamental rights of human nature.”).
94 Daniel Webster, The Constitution and the Union (Mar. 7, 1850), in THE GREAT
SPEECHES AND ORATIONS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 600, 620–21 (1886) (calling the imprisonment
of free black seamen a “tangible and irritating cause of grievance at the North” as
northerners deem “such imprisonments illegal and unconstitutional; and as the cases
occur constantly and frequently, they regard it as a great grievance”).
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accorded to citizens in pari conditione of the States where these laws obtain
and are enforced.”95
Ohio’s Senator Salmon Chase responded by insisting that “the privileges
of citizens in every other state” included “those rights and immunities, that
security and that protection to which [all] citizens generally, male or female,
minors or adults, are entitled.”96
But it was not merely the South where efforts were made to restrict the
travel and economic rights of free blacks.  In the Midwest and West, various
proposals and laws generated extensive debate in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury.  In Ohio, for instance, pro-racial-equality legislators successfully argued
that the state’s “black laws”—which restricted free blacks’ right to travel,
reside, work, and testify—violated Article IV, since the laws “require of the
colored citizen coming from other States what is required of no other men,
from any other section of our country” and thus “the colored citizens of
other States, who come here to reside, are not by our laws entitled to the
same ‘privileges and immunities’ as the citizens of this State.”97
3. Right of White Citizens to Travel (Even with Their Opinions)
Besides its efforts in Congress, Massachusetts attempted to launch a judi-
cial challenge to these laws.  The South’s violent response occasioned a paral-
lel claim—that free white citizens of one state had not only an absolute right
to travel but also, perhaps, to speak freely in the other states.  In 1844, the
Massachusetts legislature sent attorneys Samuel Hoar and Henry Hubbard to
South Carolina and Louisiana, respectively, to file a federal suit against the
95 PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, ON THE FUGITIVE SLAVE BILL 38 (1850);
CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1659 app. (1850) (remarks of Louisiana Sen. Pierre
Soule); see also id. at 528 (remarks of Sen. Joseph Underwood of Kentucky); id. at 477
(South Carolina Sen. Andrew Butler).  After the war, A.H. Stephens made a similar
defense of the treatment of black seamen:
When [citizens of Massachusetts] are in South Carolina, they are upon the same
footing as the citizens of that State, so far as concerns the criminal law of the
State; and that imprisonment may be as rightfully resorted to, to prevent the com-
mission of crime, as to punish it after its commission.
2 ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES
74–75 (1870).
96 APPENDIX TO THE CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., 477 (1850) (emphasis added).
The most extensive, if not scholarly, elaboration of this argument occurred in a lengthy
article, published in parts over several months in the New Englander.  Joseph Larned, Mas-
sachusetts and South Carolina, 3 NEW ENGLANDER 411 (1845); id. at 606; 4 NEW ENGLANDER
195 (1846); see also, e.g., 3 NEW ENGLANDER, at 621–23 (noting that the “absolute right[ ]”
to enter could be regulated by quarantine laws but a racial exclusion law “denies the title”).
97 REP. OF THE SELECT COMM. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE REPEAL OF CERTAIN LAWS MAKING
DISTINCTIONS ON ACCOUNT OF COLOR, in 45 JOURNAL OF THE H. OF REPS. OF THE STATE OF
OHIO 123, 124–25 (1847).  The Committee also concluded that the Constitution prohib-
ited the states from reserving the common schools for whites, though the Committee did
not specify the clause establishing the prohibition. Id. at 126; see also Paul Finkelman, The
Strange Career of Race Discrimination in Antebellum Ohio, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 373, 377 &
n.17 (2004) (citing and discussing Act of Feb. 10, 1849 § 6, 47 Ohio Laws 17, 18 (1849)).
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negro seamen acts.98  Both Hoar and Hubbard were effectively driven from
the South under threat of mob violence, a threat sanctioned by state offi-
cials.99  In response, many northerners complained that South Carolina and
Louisiana had violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause not only by
enforcing the negro seamen acts, but also by failing to protect Hoar and
Hubbard’s right to travel and file a lawsuit to challenge these acts.100  As one
contemporary recalled:
How such an event was related to the Constitution may be judged by refer-
ence to [the Privileges and Immunities Clause].  The anti-slavery men of the
North bore this patiently, and only raised another degree their determina-
tion to achieve that sublime revenge which the poet [John Greenleaff] Whit-
tier invoked on that occasion: “Have they chained our free-born men?  Let
us unchain theirs.”101
The treatment of Hoar and Hubbard was only the most prominent
example of the intolerance faced by white antislavery citizens visiting the
South.  From the 1830s onward, it became increasingly unsafe to travel in the
South if one simply held, let alone expressed, convictions friendly to the free-
dom and citizenship rights of blacks, due to both legal restriction and politi-
cally sanctioned violence.  There were few reported cases of prosecutions,
because tolerated mob violence proved so effective.102  One (in)famous inci-
dent involved an Oberlin student, Amos Dresser, who having been “found in
possession of an anti-slavery paper with one of the so-called incendiary pic-
tures, . . . was severely whipped and expelled from the South.”103
In response to these outrages, some antislavery northerners understand-
ably turned to the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a source of not only
the right to travel, but also the freedoms of opinion, speech, and press.104
With reference to the Dresser incident, Iowa’s George Ellis declared that, by
the Clause, a citizen of Iowa should enjoy in Louisiana “the right of free
speech and free thought” as well as “the right of locomotion,” for “he is just
as completely guarded and protected [there] as if he were in his own State of
98 1 HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA
582–83 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1872).
99 Id. at 578–86.
100 See Mr. Hoar’s Mission, 7 S. Q. REV. 455, 456 (1845).  For a good post-bellum, anti-
slavery account of the “imprisonment of colored seamen” and Hoar and Hubbard’s trips,
see WILSON, supra note 98, at 576–86.
101 The Anti-Slavery Revolution in America, 86 LITTELL’S LIVING AGE 193, 202 (1865).  The
quotation is from Whittier’s “To Faneuil Hall,” which, Whittier explained, was “[w]ritten in
1844, on reading a call by ‘a Massachusetts Freeman’ for a meeting in Faneuil Hall of the
citizens of Massachusetts, without distinction of party, opposed to the annexation of Texas,
and the aggressions of South Carolina, and in favor of decisive action against slavery.”
JOHN G. WHITTIER, VOICES OF FREEDOM 155, 157 (4th ed. 1846).
102 HART, supra note 62, at 235.
103 Id. at 236.  For other cases, see id. at 234–37.
104 See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 138–39 (1986).
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Iowa.”105  These rights are to be enjoyed “wherever the flag of this Union
may wave.”106  In a similar vein, Yale jurist Joseph Larned107 applied Corfield,
Blackstone, and other authorities to reject the in pari conditione reading, and
to vindicate the “absolute and unqualified” protection for “civil immunities
in their largest and most extensive sense,” which rights included not only
certain rights of person and property, but also the “rights of conscience.”108
The claim that the privileges of citizenship embraced the freedoms of
communication seemed a plausible conclusion from Corfield.  Justice
Bushrod Washington had there defined “privileges and immunities of citi-
zens” as those “which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments;
and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states
which compose this Union.”109  The freedoms of speech and press would
seem to qualify.  Washington’s law teacher, James Wilson, had written, “The
citizen under a free government has a right to think, to speak, to write, to print,
and to publish freely, but with decency and truth, concerning publick men,
publick bodies, and publick measures”;110 Wilson expressly identified this
right as a privilege of citizenship, distinct from the rights of aliens.111  In a
similar vein, Kent argued that because the freedoms of speech and press were
105 2 STATE OF IOWA, DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 906 (Luse, Lane &
Co. 1857). Accord 9 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
CONVENTION TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 372 (Harrisburg, Packer,
Barrett, and Parke 1838) (indicating that “[the] glorious privileges of American citizen-
ship” included “the free interchange and communication of thoughts and opinions”).
106 2 STATE OF IOWA, DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 105, at
907; see also PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH NEW ENGLAND ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION 123
(Boston, Isaac Knapp 1837) (declaring, with apparent reference to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, that “in the slaveholding States, by Lynch clubs and vigilance commit-
tees, as well as by unconstitutional laws, the use of the U.S. Mail—the freedom of conscience, of
locomotion, of speech, and of the press, is denied to those citizens of the United States . . . who hold to
the doctrine of the Declaration of American Independence, as evinced in the cases of John
Hopper of New York, of Albe Dean of Connecticut, and Amos Dresser of Massachusetts”
and that “by these outrages, the slaveholding States of this confederacy have already
deprived a large portion of the citizens of the free States, of most of those privileges and
blessings, for the security of which the Union was established” (emphasis added)).
107 2 CONNECTICUT BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 2008–2009 EDITION, 374–75 (Caryn Han-
nan ed. 2008) (providing short biography of Joseph Gay Eaton Larned).
108 Joseph Larned, Massachusetts and South Carolina, 3 NEW ENGLANDER 430 (1845).  The
rights protected were privileges of citizenship, and not universal human rights, for these
had been “rights to which strangers to the British state had only a qualified and contingent
title, but to which persons born in the realm had, by the cardinal doctrines of the common
law, an absolute and unqualified title.” Id. at 430.
109 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
110 JAMES WILSON, Of Citizens and Aliens, in THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WIL-
SON 443 (Bird Wilson ed., 1804) (emphasis added).
111 Id.  That the freedoms of communication, especially political communication, were
privileges of citizenship, and not universal human rights, was strongly suggested by Found-
ing-era documents. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 6 (1803) (guaranteeing only to
“[e]very citizen” the “indisputable right to speak, write or print upon any subject as he
thinks proper, being liable for the abuse of that liberty”).
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so essential to that “control over their rulers, which resides in the free people
of these United States” that it has “become a constitutional principle in this
country, that ‘every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his senti-
ments, on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and that
no law can rightfully be passed to restrain or abridge the freedom of speech,
or of the press.’”112
Although analytically persuasive, this elaboration of Corfield remained
outside the political mainstream for at least three reasons.  First, citizens and
officials in the South would simply not tolerate the open communication of
anything resembling abolitionism.  In denying Hoar the right to travel and
challenge South Carolina’s laws, the state’s legislature heartily approved the
coercion: Hoar came here “not as a citizen of the United States, but as the
emissary of a Foreign Government, hostile to our domestic institutions, and
with the sole purpose of subverting our internal peace.”113  Louisiana’s legis-
lature ratified Hubbard’s violent expulsion in similar terms.114  Second,
northerners lacked the political will to even suggest the extensive federal
coercive presence that was necessary to ensure this freedom.115  Indeed,
some antislavery jurists tended to insist on the right to travel with one’s opin-
ions, but not necessarily the right to communicate those opinions in other
states.116  Third, significant northern authority, especially James Kent, had
supported the strict interstate-equality reading,117 which was easily invoked to
112 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 14 (1827) (quoting NEW YORK
CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1821)); see also JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 263 (1842) (citing Blackstone to the effect that “the liberty
of the press, properly understood, is essential to the nature of a free state”).
113 H.R. 1844 Leg. (S.C. 1844); Letter of Thomas W. Glover, Clerk of House of Repre-
sentatives, to J.H. Hammond, Governor of South Carolina (Dec. 6, 1844), in JOURNAL OF
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA SESSION 1845–1846 Doc. No. 1, at 87 (1845).
114 The legislature protested “against the interposition . . . between the police regula-
tions of this state and persons affected by them as an interference subversive of our domes-
tic order and dangerous to the public peace” and proclaimed that “this state will not
recognize nor tolerate any mission, private or public, for the purpose of bringing and prose-
cuting suits in behalf of colored persons at the expense of that state.”  3 WESTON ARTHUR
GOODSPEED, THE PROVINCE AND THE STATES 111 (1904) (quoting this resolution) (emphasis
added).
115 Editorial, A Waste of Labor, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 1860), http://www.nytimes.com/
1860/03/16/news/a-waste-of-labor.html (noting that mob violence in the South was so
prevalent against anyone suspected of antislavery opinions that any federal statute protect-
ing such travelers would be a mere “dead letter”).
116 WILLIAM GOODELL, VIEWS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ITS BEARING UPON
AMERICAN SLAVERY 76–77 (2d ed. 1845) (contending that both the laws and lawless violence
prevalent in the slaveholding states directly violate the Clause by preventing free black
citizens and antislavery citizens from traveling in those states—even where the antislavery
citizens had written against slavery in the free states).
117 See, e.g., Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 577 (N.Y. 1812) (opinion of Kent,
C.J.) (affirming that the Clause “means only that citizens of other states shall have equal
rights with our own citizens, and not that they shall have different or greater rights”); 2
KENT, supra note 112, at 61 (stating, with reference to racial discrimination in particular,
that “if [citizens] remove from one state to another, they are entitled to the privileges that
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reconcile the Clause with these brute political facts.  If residents of the South
would be subject to mob violence for expressing antislavery opinion, it was
said, visitors from the North could constitutionally demand no better
treatment.118
C. That Politically Marginalized and Judicially “Unexplored Clause”
Although politically prominent, these debates proved only sporadic, and
were effectively marginalized in the wake of the Compromise of 1850.  In the
1852 election, the two major parties effectively declared all slavery-related
issues “settled” and denounced as troublemakers those who would raise these
question again.119  Former northern grievances were therefore relegated to a
third party, the Free Soil Party, which declared,
the practice of imprisoning colored seamen of other states while the vessels
to which they belong lie in port, and refusing the exercise of the right [by
Hoar and Hubbard] to bring such cases before the Supreme Court of the
United States, to test the legality of such proceedings, is a flagrant violation
persons of the same description are entitled to in the state to which the removal is made,
and to none other”).
118 POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT, REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL (Dec. 1, 1835),
reprinted in APPENDIX TO THE CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 9 (1835) (“[T]his clause
cannot confer on the citizens of one State, higher privileges and immunities in another,
than the citizens of the latter themselves possess.  It is not easy, therefore, to perceive how
the citizens of the Northern States can possess, or claim the privilege of carrying on discus-
sions within the Southern States by the distribution of printed papers which the citizens of
the latter are forbidden to circulate by their own laws.”); S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, INTER-
FERENCE OF FEDERAL OFFICERS IN ELECTIONS (Jan. 31, 1839), reprinted in APPENDIX TO THE
CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 3d Sess. 157, 160 (1839) (stating that federal law cannot con-
strain political activities of federal officeholders, for the states have the exclusive authority
“to prescribe the privileges and immunities of their citizens”); see also The North and South, 4
MD. COLONIZATION J. 35, 53–54 (1847) (denying that northerners have “any right to speak
and write to us” on slavery, for if in a southern state, such as Virginia, they have only “‘all
privileges and immunities’ which Virginians themselves there enjoy”).
119 Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Democratic Party Platform of 1852, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29575 (last visited Feb. 30, 2015)
(resolving that an affirmation of states’ rights embraces “the whole subject of slavery agita-
tion in Congress” and that, in light of the Compromise of 1850, “the democratic party will
resist all attempts at renewing, in congress or out of it, the agitation of the slavery question,
under whatever shape or color the attempt may be made”); Gerhard Peters & John T.
Woolley, Whig Party Platform of 1852, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25856 (last visited Feb. 30, 2015) (accepting the Compromise of
1850 and declaring that “we deprecate all further agitation of the question thus settled, as
dangerous to our peace; and will discountenance all efforts to continue or renew such
agitation whenever, wherever, or however the attempt may be made”).
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of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.120  The election left this noisy little
party with only four seats in the House of Representatives and 4.9% of the
presidential vote.121
Besides this political marginalization, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause remained largely unexplored even by jurists.  As Attorney General
Caleb Cushing remarked in 1856, the provision remained “that unexplored
clause of the constitution.”122  Indeed, before the late 1850s, the judiciary
had not offered any clear, authoritative interpretation.  As one jurist wrote at
time, “[t]his clause has not yet received the attention which from its impor-
tance it would have been expected to command.  It has been considered but
in a few instances, and no general authoritative exposition of it has yet been
declared.”123
This judicial reluctance was surely related to the deep political divides,
whether over black citizenship or otherwise.  When, in 1856, the Supreme
Court finally decided a case arising under the Clause, Justice Curtis, speaking
for a unanimous bench, carefully avoided any general interpretation, partly
because the provision involved “matters of delicacy and great importance.”124
120 Free Democratic Convention—1852: Platform, in A POLITICAL TEXT-BOOK FOR 1860,
at 21 (New York, The Tribune Assoc. 1860).
121 DONALD R. DESKINS, JR. ET AL., PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1789–2008 149 (2010).
122 Caleb Cushing, Relation of Indians to Citizenship, 7 OPINION ATT’Y GEN. 746, 751
(1856).
123 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETA-
TION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 600–601 (New York, John
S. Voorhies 1857).  In a footnote, the author explained that “[t]he case known as the Dred
Scott Case, recently decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, is understood to
have incidentally discussed this subject; but we have as yet no authoritative report of the
judgment of the court.” Id. at 604, n.†; see also CHARLES B. GOODRICH, THE SCIENCE OF
GOVERNMENT 285, 288 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1853) (stating that the Clause’s
“import and effect has not been the subject of consideration or of adjudication in the
courts of the United States” and the Clause has “been the subject of error and mistake in
opinions which have been put forth”); The Case of Dred Scott, 20 MONTHLY L. REP. 61, 80
(1857) (“Precisely what rights are guarantied by this clause, or how it is to be enforced, has
never been judicially determined, nor has its practical construction been uniform . . . .”).
124 Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 593 (1855) (“We do not deem it needful to
attempt to define the meaning of the word privileges in this clause of the constitution.  It is
safer, and more in accordance with the duty of a judicial tribunal, to leave its meaning to
be determined, in each case, upon a view of the particular rights asserted and denied
therein.  And especially is this true, when we are dealing with so broad a provision, involv-
ing matters not only of great delicacy and importance, but which are of such a character,
that any merely abstract definition could scarcely be correct; and a failure to make it so
would certainly produce mischief.”); see also Sears v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 36 Ind. 267, 276
(1871) (making this same claim in precisely these words); Ward v. State, 31 Md. 279, 290
(1869) (stating, with reference to Conner, that “[t]he Supreme Court [has] declined to give
a general construction to this clause”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2760, 2765
(remarks of Sen. Howard) (noting that the Supreme Court, in Conner, had refrained from
describing either the “nature” or the “extent” of the rights guaranteed by the Clause).
Justice Curtis, the author of the Conner opinion, was well aware of one of these delicate
matters, for fifteen years earlier, he had signed the controversial petition challenging
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 25 30-MAR-16 15:52
2016] the  meanings  of  privileges  and  immunities 1141
III. THE MEANINGS OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE: 1857–1861
In the four years before the Civil War, however, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause suddenly became a prominent subject of sustained
national debate, whether in courts, legislative halls, or among the people at
large.  The aggravated fracturing of the American polity occasioned at least
three distinct and conflicting interpretations of the Clause: (1) a pro-slavery,
absolute-rights reading; (2) an anti-slavery, absolute-rights reading adopted
by Republicans, which sometimes incorporated claims of black citizenship; and
(3) the strictly interstate-equality reading still held by many northern and
border-state Democrats, especially on the bench.
A. The Pro-Slavery Absolute-Rights Reading
In the 1850s, in courts, legislatures, and the press, southern Democrats
and even some of their northern allies began to insist that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause guaranteed a right of slave transit as part of the national
privileges of citizenship secured by Article IV.  As indicated above, the argu-
ment had first appeared in a handful of obscure cases.  But in the 1850s, this
litigation achieved national prominence.  In California, a citizen from Missis-
sippi, in a suit to recover custody of an alleged slave, argued before the state’s
supreme court that by force of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, he was
exempt from local antislavery law while temporarily in California.125  On the
other coast, and more famously, this same argument was made in New York
by Charles O’Conor, who had been hired by the State of Virginia126 to
defend the slaveholding rights of one of Virginia’s citizens: Juliet Lemmon,
whose alleged property (eight slaves) had been emancipated by New York
authorities while she was sojourning in the state.127  O’Conor argued that the
Clause secured the privileges of U.S. citizenship:
The Constitution recognizes the legal character “citizen of the United
States” as well as citizen of a particular State.  The latter term refers only to
domicil; for every citizen of a particular State is a citizen of the United States.
And the object of this section is to secure to the citizen, when within a State
in which he is not domiciled, the general privileges and immunities which,
in the very nature of citizenship, as recognized and established by the Fed-
eral Constitution, belonged to that status; so that by no partial and adverse
legislation of a State into which he may go as a stranger or a sojourner can
he be deprived of them.128
South Carolina’s law restricting the travel of free blacks. See WINTHROP, supra note 87, at
351.
125 Ex parte Archy, 9 Cal. 147, 152–53 (1858) (argument of counsel for petitioner) (“Is
[the Clause] consistent with a State regulation which would deny the immunities of a citi-
zen in this State to a citizen of the State of Mississippi?”).
126 FINKELMAN, supra note 67, at 302.
127 Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 599–600 (1860).
128 REPORT OF THE LEMMON SLAVE CASE, supra note 29, at 25 (internal citations
omitted).
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Under the Clause, every citizen sojourning in another state enjoys not
“the privileges of citizens of the particular State in which they are wayfarers,
or of the State in which they are domiciled, but the general privileges of a
citizen of the United States;” he is entitled
to the rites of hospitality, to the ordinary enjoyment of society during his
temporary sojourn with us, the undisturbed possession of his property, and
the undisturbed enjoyment of his domestic relations, and of every accessary
and incident of a purely personal or domestic character which he may be
permitted to enjoy,
provided he does not invade “the peace and happiness of our peo-
ple.”129  In opposition, William Evarts endorsed the simple interstate-equality
reading: the Clause merely secures “to the citizens of every State, within every
other, the privileges and immunities (whatever they may be) accorded in
each to its own citizens.”130
The highest courts in both California and New York gave serious consid-
eration to this claim.  In California, the court agreed.  After citing with
approval both the Dred Scott case and the pro-slave-transit interpretations
offered by the Missouri and Illinois courts,131 the judges declared “that the
right of transit through each State, with every species of property known to
the Constitution of the United States, and recognized by that paramount law,
is secured by that instrument to each citizen, and does not depend upon the
uncertain and changeable ground of mere comity.”132  This conclusion was
endorsed by both the participating judges.133  A third member of the court,
Stephen Field—the future author of the Court’s seminal opinion in Paul v.
Virginia134—was conspicuously absent135 and remained deafeningly silent
about this controversial decision throughout his entire life.136
129 Id. at 44, 109.
130 Id. at 78.
131 See Willard v. People, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 461, 472 (1843); Julia v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 270,
272 (1833); see also supra notes 65–66 (discussing these cases).
132 Ex parte Archy, 9 Cal. 147, 163–64 (1858).  The Court added, however, that local law
would equally apply to the sojourner “in the prosecution of his business in this State,” so
the sojourner could travel with and enjoy the services of his slaves, but not “hire out his
slave, or use his labor in the prosecution of any business.” Id. at 168–69.
133 Id. at 171.
134 75 U.S. (7 Wall.) 168 (1868).
135 Judge Joseph Grodin, without citation, has written that Field “was on leave from the
court, and out of the state at the time Archy’s case was decided.”  Joseph R. Grodin, The
California Supreme Court and State Constitutional Rights: The Early Years, 31 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 141, 147 (2004).
136 CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 74 (Archon Books
1963) (1930) (“If Field sat in the case he recorded no expression of his opinion.”); see also
STEPHEN J. FIELD & GEORGE C. GORHAM, PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF EARLY DAYS IN CALI-
FORNIA, WITH OTHER SKETCHES 122–42 (1893) (recounting his experiences on the Califor-
nia court but making no mention of this (in)famous case).  At the time, one local
newspaper reportedly had the “assurance that Judge Field does not concur.”  William E.
Franklin, The Archy Case: The California Supreme Court Refuses to Free a Slave, 32 PAC. HIST. R.
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In New York, however, a five-justice majority rejected the claim and
adopted the interstate-equality reading.  Writing for the court, Judge Denio
held that the Clause meant simply “that in a given State, every citizen of every
other State shall have the same privileges and immunities—that is, the same
rights—which the citizens of that State possess.”137  Still, three of the eight
justices rejected this interpretation, sided with Virginia, and endorsed the
right of slave transit, whether on constitutional or other grounds.138
The pro-slavery argument appeared prominently outside the courts as
well.  In 1858, former Attorney General Cushing seemingly complained that
northern states had engaged in “abandonment or perversion of the Constitu-
tion” by assuming “to confiscate the property and other domestic rights of
citizens of the South, sojourning or in transit at the North.”139  Some pro-
slavery jurists made similar claims.140
Prominent Democratic periodicals and jurists made the same argument,
including the Washington Union, an organ of the Buchanan administra-
tion,141 and the Jacksonian Democratic Review.142  In the Review, Horace
Dresser, like O’Conor, insisted that the Clause secured to sojourners certain
absolute rights throughout the Union: the privileges of a “federal, national,
or American citizenship,”143 defined as the “immunities and privileges of citi-
zenship” that subjects in British North America had enjoyed before indepen-
dence “in their colonial capacity”; found in “the great catalogue of English
137, 152 (1963) (quoting SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION (Feb. 18, 1858)).  I have not found any
record of Field publicly making this assurance.
137 Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 608 (1860).
138 Id. at 632–37 (Clerke, J., dissenting); id. at 644 (Comstock, C.J., dissenting); id.
(Selden, J., dissenting).
139 Letter from Sen. Henry Wilson to Hon. Caleb Cushing 5 (1860) (quoting Caleb
Cushing’s remarks).
140 1 THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 199, 316 (1858) (affirming that a bona fide citizen enjoys certain “privi-
leges given to citizens of the United States” and arguing, with apparent reference to the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, that the Constitution secures to the citizen the same
“privileges and protection . . . awarded to him, through comity, by the courts of indepen-
dent nations,” including the right of slave transit); M.T. WHEAT, THE PROGRESS AND INTELLI-
GENCE OF AMERICANS 591 (2d ed. 1862) (affirming that under the Clause, “[t]he title of
citizen of the United States . . . protects the person and property . . . of whatever kind, of a
citizen within the whole limits of the United States, as the person of the citizen is passing in
transitu with his property” (emphasis added)).  Marvin Wheat was a pro-slavery jurist from
Kentucky. See HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 28 (2000).
141 According to the editors, by the Clause, “[e]very citizen of one State coming into
another State has, therefore, a right to the protection of his person, and that property
which is recognized as such by the Constitution of the United States, any law of a State to
the contrary notwithstanding.” APPENDIX TO THE CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 199
(1858) (quoting Editorial, Free Soilism, WASH. UNION (Nov. 17, 1857), http://chroniclin-
gamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82006534/1857-11-17/ed-1/seq-2/ (also cited in Lash, supra
note 10, at 1278, n.169)).
142 Horace Dresser, Slavery and the Slave Trade, 43 U.S. DEMOCRATIC REV. 304, 307–11
(1859).
143 Id. at 308.
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usages and customs,” including, ultimately, the right to become “a land-
holder, a householder, a slaveholder,” etc.144  Unlike Justice Washington,
then, Dresser found the standard not in the rights enjoyed by citizens of all
free governments, including the several states since independence, but in the
rights enjoyed just before independence and only in the North American
colonies, where slavery was legal.145  Conversely, Dresser repudiated Kent’s
interstate-equality reading—and attributed Kent’s “loose and careless” inter-
pretation to a failure to acknowledge “a fixed, permanent, federal citizen-
ship, contradistinguished from State citizenship.”146
During the winter of secession, Confederate leaders endorsed this inter-
pretation.  In December 1860, Senator Jefferson Davis charted that some
northern states had violated the citizens’ constitutional right to “free transit
over all the other states” by seizing “property recognized by the Constitution
of the United States, but prohibited by the laws of that State,”147 and South
Carolina’s secession convention similarly alleged that in New York, “even the
[constitutional] right of transit for a slave has been denied by her tribu-
nals.”148  Finally, to avoid any such misconstruction, in their new and
improved constitution, Confederate leaders attached a clarificatory provision
to the Privileges and Immunities Clause:
The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several States; and shall have the right of transit and
sojourn in any State of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other prop-
erty; and the right of property in said slaves shall not be thereby
impaired.149
This pro-slavery interpretation must be considered novel, if not radical,
in at least two respects.  First, the evidence from the framing of the Constitu-
tion indicates that it was wholly opposed to the original understanding of
Article IV.150  Indeed, the claim could not have satisfied the standard
famously proclaimed by the Virginia slaveholder Bushrod Washington in
144 Id. at 307.
145 If the English common law, instead of North American colonial law, had provided the
national standard of “privileges and immunities,” neither slavery nor the right of slave
transit would have been included.  2 JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BOND-
AGE IN THE UNITED STATES 368 (1862).
146 Dresser, supra note 142, at 310.
147 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. at 29–30 (1860) (quote of Sen. Jefferson Davis).
148 Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of
South Carolina from the Federal Union (Dec. 24, 1860), in 2 ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A
CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES 671, 674 (1870).
149 CONFEDERATE CONST. art. IV. § 2, cl. 1 (1861); see also, e.g., A.O.P. Nicholson, The
Permanent Constitution of the Confederate States, NASHVILLE UNION & AM. (July 10, 1861),
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85038518/1861-07-10/ed-1/seq-2/ (stating
that this provision does “no more than place upon the old Constitution the meaning which
its framers intended it to have” and “the true reading of the old Constitution, as
expounded by the highest judicial tribunal”).  Nicholson was an ex-Senator from Tennes-
see and the postbellum Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court.
150 See Upham, supra note 54, at 139–45.
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Corfield.  The right to hold slaves was not enjoyed by the citizens of all free
governments,151 nor had it been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states
since independence.152
Second, this new position marked a stark reversal from the position
taken by southerners, and especially South Carolina, just a few decades ear-
lier.  This new position, affirming a constitutional right to exemption from
local laws, could seemingly support the claims made on behalf of traveling
black citizens.  When faced with this implication in the Lemmon case,
O’Conor provided this “very short answer.  It is this: these free negroes are
not and never can be made citizens of the United States.”153  In a similar
vein, in 1859, Mississippi’s High Court of Errors and Appeals frankly acknowl-
edged that its treatment of free blacks from other states was flatly inconsistent
with blacks’ enjoyment of the rights of citizenship.154  No longer did pro-
slavery Americans use the interstate-equality reading of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause to reject blacks’ Article IV claims.  Rather, pro-slavery
jurists relied exclusively on the non-citizenship of free blacks to affirm the
constitutionality of local racist policies.
Ironically, this new absolute-rights interpretation of the Clause gave
southerners a (virtually) new argument155 against black citizenship: free
blacks could not be citizens precisely because they would thus be entitled,
while sojourning in the slaveholding states, to the absolute rights of travel,
property acquisition, speech, assembly, arms, etc., racist state laws to the con-
trary notwithstanding—and this result was unthinkable.  This parade of hor-
151 Free governments included the government of Britain, where slavery was illegal. Cf.
2 HURD, supra note 145, at 367–68 (arguing that the “common standard” of the rights to be
enjoyed under the Clause should be the “preexisting quasi-international law of the colo-
nies,” and that “so far as the common law of England, operating as a personal law with
national extent in the colonies or the States, was the standard of these rights, it did not
maintain the claim of a slave-owner”).
152 For example, Massachusetts abolished slavery by force of its constitution of 1780.
Massachusetts Constitution and the Abolition of Slavery, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/
courts/court-info/sjc/edu-res-center/abolition/abolition1-gen.html (last visited Feb. 30,
2015).
153 REPORT OF THE LEMMON SLAVE CASE, supra note 29, at 109.
154 Mississippi’s court frankly, if not cheerfully, affirmed that the state did not generally
treat free blacks as citizens, but rather, as “alien enemies,” enjoying neither the right to
reside, nor the right to “take nor hold property,” nor even any “customary rights which are
founded on the jus naturali or jus gentium,” though such rights are given, by indulgence, to
some native-born free blacks.  Heirn v. Bridault, 37 Miss. 209, 232–33 (1859); see also Mitch-
ell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 249, 259 (1859) (holding that free blacks, even if treated as
citizens in one state, could enjoy none of the “rights of citizenship as a member of the Union,”
and indicating that these privileges included “the right to sue” and “the right to acquire or
hold property in this State”).
155 The argument was not entirely new. See Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553 (Pa. 1837); see
also supra note 78 (discussing Hobbs).
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ribles was famously set forth by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott156 and
echoed by pro-slavery jurists.157
The largely new, pro-slavery absolute-rights reading involved another
possible northern objection: Should not sojourning abolitionists enjoy as
much an exemption from local anti-abolitionist laws as sojourning slavehold-
ers were claiming against local anti-slavery law?  But Charles O’Conor and
Justice Taney, at least, seemed to have anticipated this counter-claim.  In his
closing argument, O’Conor carefully qualified the absolute rights of sojourn-
ing citizens with this phrase: “without invading the peace and happiness of
our people.”158  He elaborated, “Over this right of free intercourse between
the citizens of different States, the States have reserved no power except the
police power.  That natural and inalienable right of self-defence is indeed
reserved to the States.”159  Room was thus left for the southern states to insist
that they could, in the interest of protecting the peace of the local white
community, use the police power to suppress any speech they deemed
incendiary.
Taney anticipated the objection by providing a more targeted and
explicit—and thus ham-handed—qualification: the sojourning citizen would
enjoy “the full liberty of speech in public and in private” but only “upon all
subjects upon which its own citizens might speak.”160  Taney conspicuously did not
make this qualification with respect to the right to travel, hold meetings, and
bear arms.161  This awkward, incongruous qualification served the apparent
156 If free blacks could be citizens, the Constitution
would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as citizens in any
one State of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever they
pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruc-
tion, to sojourn there as long as they pleased, to go where they pleased at every
hour of the day or night without molestation, unless they committed some viola-
tion of law for which a white man would be punished; and it would give them the
full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own
citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep
and carry arms wherever they went.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857).  If a citizen, a freedman
might have visited and sojourned in Maryland when he pleased, and as long as he
pleased, as a citizen of the United States; and the State officers and tribunals
would be compelled, by the paramount authority of the Constitution, to receive
him and treat him as one of its citizens, exempt from the laws and police of the
State in relation to a person of that description.
Id. at 425.
157 GEORGE S. SAWYER, SOUTHERN INSTITUTES 299–300 (1859) (arguing that as citizens,
free blacks would enjoy the travel and economic privileges set forth in Corfield, exempt
from racial and any other “arbitrar[y]” discriminations); WHEAT, supra note 140 at 593
(arguing that if free blacks were citizens, “the slave States have ever acted unconstitution-
ally with most of the free States”); see also BELZ, supra note 140, at 28.
158 REPORT OF THE LEMMON SLAVE CASE, supra note 29, at 109
159 Id.
160 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 417 (emphasis added).
161 Id.
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purpose of ensuring that the precedent would support the sojourning citi-
zens’ constitutional right to hold slaves, but not his right to speak out against
slavery.
Despite some favorable implications of the new southern position for
anti-slavery constitutionalism,162 for the most part, the new pro-slavery inter-
pretation sparked outrage.  Republicans saw the harbingers of the “next Dred
Scott” decision that would declare slavery a constitutional right not only in the
territories, but even in the free states—at least for sojourners.  Indeed, not
only had Chief Justice Taney established the groundwork for such a develop-
ment, but Justice Nelson had expressly declared open the question of
whether the constitutional “rights and privileges” of a “citizen of the . . .
United States” included “the right of the master with his slave of transit into
or through a free State.”163  In apparent response to the question, Justice
McLean, in dissent, obtrusively asserted that the right of slave transit “is a
matter which, as I suppose, belongs exclusively to the State.”164  As Lincoln
noted, Nelson’s opinion had essentially declared the state’s authority over
slavery to be an “open question.”165  New York’s legislature feared the Court’s
answer to this question.  In response to Dred Scott, the legislature quoted with
outrage the dreams of “the devotees of slavery” that the “slave driver” will one
day “call the roll of his manacled gang at the foot of the momument [sic] on
Bunker Hill, reared and consecrated to freedom.”166  The reference was to a
comment, attributed to Senator Robert Tombs of Georgia, that he would
soon call the roll of his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill.167  Likewise, the
162 See infra Section III.B.
163 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 468 (Nelson, J., concurring).
164 Id. at 550 (McLean, J., dissenting).
165 Abraham Lincoln, A House Divided: Speech at Springfield, Ill. (June 16, 1858), in 2
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461, 467 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
166 REPORT OF JOINT COMM. OF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY RELATIVE TO A CERTAIN DECISION
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE CASE OF Dred Scott, Apr. 9, 1857,
reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK: EIGHTIETH SESSION
3 (1857); see also BAPTIST WRIOTHESLEY NOEL, THE REBELLION IN AMERICA 27 (1863) (argu-
ing that by the Dred Scott decision, “the slaveholders might parade their whips and their
chains over the whole land, laugh at the indignation of Massachusetts or Pennsylvania,
[and] bring their droves of human chattels into every New England village”).  One author
suggested that by the Dred Scott decision, this “little provision . . . is likely soon to assume
colossal dimensions.”  Polygamy, like slavery, might be given national protection, for “Mr.
Brigham Young” might claim he has the “same ‘privileges and immunities’ in New York as
to his baker’s dozen; and thus polygamy in Utah would be polygamy in New York.” The
Mormons, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Apr. 25, 1857, at 1.
167 See Dresser, supra note 142, at 317 (arguing that Tombs has the “constitutional right
to do so” pursuant to “the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States” secured by
the Privileges and Immunities Clause).  New Hampshire’s Senator John P. Hale reported
hearing the (in)famous remark, but Tombs made it not with reference to Article IV, but to
indicate his hope and expectation that the northern states would legalize slavery. See Let-
ter from Hon. J.P. Hale to Theo. Parker (Dec. 23, 1856), in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
THEODORE PARKER 223, 223–24 (John Weiss ed., 1864).
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California court’s pro-slavery decision was roundly denounced in local
newspapers.168
The arguments made by the Washington Union and the state of Virginia
(through O’Conor) only confirmed these fears.169  Indeed, the fears seemed
reasonable—as both the New York Tribune feared, and the New York Herald
happily expected, that the Supreme Court would reverse the Lemmon
decision.170
B. The Antislavery, Absolute-Rights Reading
While pro-slavery Americans were advancing one absolute-rights reading
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Republicans were promoting their
own.  The rise of the party had two prominent effects on the ways in which
anti-slavery northerners used the Clause.  First, perhaps ironically, the electo-
ral success of the party induced anti-slavery northerners to set aside the once
prominent issue of black citizenship.  The new party had rescued free soilers
and other anti-slavery citizens from marginalization and incorporated them
into a national anti-slavery party with hopes of national success; but this suc-
cess required the support of citizens, especially in the Midwest, who were at
once both anti-slavery and racist.  Indeed, the constitutions of several anti-
slavery states specifically prohibited the immigration of free blacks.  A win-
ning Republican coalition required the alliance of pro-black-citizenship New
Englanders with avowedly racist, but anti-slavery Midwesterners.
168 Franklin, supra note 136, at 151–53 (stating that the “opinion shocked and angered
many Californians” and chronicling the hostile reaction in the California press).  It should
be noted that the outrage was directed at two features of this anti-slavery opinion: (1) the
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and (2) most outrageously, the
conclusion that although his purported master had become a resident of California and
was thus constitutionally subject to local anti-slavery law, he was entitled, as a matter of
equity, to an equitable exemption, which meant that Archy would still be forcibly returned
to slavery. Id.  Eventually, Archy was freed by a federal court in a different habeas proceed-
ing. Id. at 153.
169 APPENDIX TO THE CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., 329 (1858) (“[W]hen the
Lemmon case, now before the courts in New York, shall find its way to the same tribunal
which decided Dred Scott, slavery . . . will be planted in every free State of the Union.”)
(remarks of Rep. Mason Tappan from New Hampshire); E.P. Barrows, The State and Slavery,
73 BIBLIOTHECA SACRA 749, 796 n.1 (1862) (recounting the fears of Bostonian Joel Parker
that the Supreme Court was already writing the pro-slavery opinion for the Lemmon
appeal).
170 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 265 (1861) (citing the New
York Tribune’s opinion that O’Conor’s argument “shadows forth the ground which that
Court intends to occupy as the next step in advance,” and therefore “that there can be no
law of any one of the Free States competent to its abolition within the limits of such State,
while a single Slave State remains in the Union”); Editorial, The Great Question of the Day—Is
Secession Revolution or Not?, N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 27, 1860, at 4 (allaying secessionists’ fears as
to slave-transit right under Article IV, because “[f]rom some of the grounds on which the
decision in the Dred Scott case was based, there can be little doubt that the decision of the
New York courts will be reversed, and the rights of the slaveholder maintained”).
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The reaction to the Dred Scott decision manifested how the issue strained
the Republican coalition.  Republicans were united in rejecting Taney’s
claim that the Constitution mandated slavery in the territories, but divided as
to the Court’s principal holding—that free blacks were not citizens under the
Constitution.  The legislatures of Maine and New Hampshire, for instance,
denounced the decision, and specifically insisted that free blacks born in
those states were citizens and thus fully entitled to the privileges of citizen-
ship in the other states under Article IV.171  But west of the Appalachians,
Republican leaders were divided.  Consider, for instance, the 1858 debates
over Oregon’s proposed constitution, where the Bill of Rights protected
Oregonians in such rights as the freedom of speech and press, as well as the
freedom from the presence of free blacks: “No free negro or mulatto, not
residing in this State at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall
come, reside or be within this State, or hold any real estate, or make any
contracts, or maintain any suit therein . . . .”172  At the Oregon constitutional
convention, seemingly no one in opposition invoked the privileges of citizen-
ship under Article IV, as the sole recorded objection was to prohibit blacks
from filing suit was to deny them the universal human right of protection of
the laws.173  In Congress, however, Ohio’s Congressman Bingham objected
to the entire provision, and invoked not only human rights, but also the con-
stitutional privileges of citizenship.174  At the same time, however, his fellow
Republican from Illinois, Senator Lyman Trumbull, tersely stated that he was
“not prepared” to say that a state could not exclude free blacks from other
states.175
Trumbull was wise to avoid the issue.  During the Illinois Senate cam-
paign of the previous year, Abraham Lincoln had badly stumbled over the
question of free-black citizenship.  In his initial response to the decision, Lin-
171 Resolutions of the Legislature of the State of Maine, in Relation to the Decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Case of Dred Scott, Dec. 18, 1857, in MIS-
CELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. No.
14, at 2 (1858); Resolution of the New Hampshire Legislature (June 27, 1857), in LAWS OF
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, JUNE SESSION, 1857, at 1925 (1857).  New Hampshire passed
a clarifying law that affirmed that
neither descent, near or remote, from a person of African blood, whether such a
person is or may have been a slave, nor color of skin, shall disqualify any person
from becoming a citizen of this State, or deprive such person of the full rights and
privileges of a citizen thereof.
Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, 41 N.H. 553, 556 (1861) (quoting
an Act to Secure Freedom and the Rights of Citizenship to Persons in This State and stat-
ing that the purpose of the statute was “to remove any doubts that might have arisen after
the decision in the case of Dred Scott” as to black citizenship in the state).
172 OR. CONST. art. I, § 35 (1859) (repealed Nov. 2, 1926).
173 OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1857, at 384–85 (Charles Henry Carey ed. 1926) (remarks of Delegate
Watkins) (arguing that such a prohibition would place free blacks outside “the pale and
protection of our laws”).
174 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984–85 (1859).
175 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965 (1858).
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coln indicated his opposition to the Court’s holding that free blacks were not
constitutional citizens.176  A year later, Lincoln suggested that he favored
free blacks’ enjoyment of citizenship under Article IV as well as Article III, for
he noted, with apparent disapproval, the Court’s decision “to deprive the
negro, in every possible event, of the benefit of [the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause].”177
During the fall debates with Lincoln, Douglas seized on this latter
remark, and accused Lincoln of supporting black citizenship under the
Clause.  According to Douglas, such constitutional citizenship would invali-
date Illinois laws that prohibited blacks’ (1) immigration into the state,
(2) participation in the suffrage,178 and (3) intermarriage with whites.179
Lincoln’s response was less than straightforward.  Under pressure from
Douglas, he eventually responded at the close of the fourth debate by saying
that his objection was only that other states should be able to grant citizenship
to free blacks, but that he would oppose any such action by Illinois.180  But in
the last debate at Alton, Lincoln performed a complete flip-flop, declaring
that he never had any objection whatsoever to the Court’s decision on black
citizenship.181
Second, at the same time, however, the Republican Party’s success
brought to the center of American political debate the previously marginal
176 See 2 LINCOLN, supra note 165, at 398, 408 (arguing for Scott’s citizenship “at least”
under Article III).
177 Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
178 See 3 LINCOLN, supra note 25, at 9.  Lincoln said:
If you desire negro citizenship, if you desire to allow them to come into the State
and settle with the white man, if you desire them to vote on an equality with
yourselves, and to make them eligible to office, to serve on juries, and to adjudge
your rights, then support Mr. Lincoln and the Black Republican party, who are in
favor of the citizenship of the negro.
Id.
179 See Douglas, supra note 26.  Many antebellum authorities agreed that if free blacks
were full citizens under Article IV, they would be entitled to intermarry with whites. See
David R. Upham, Interracial Marriage and the Original Understanding of the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 233–35 (2015).
180 Abraham Lincoln, Fourth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Charleston, Illinois
(Sept. 18, 1858), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 25, at 145, 179.
In the House Divided speech, he said,
I mentioned that as one of the points decided in the course of the Supreme
Court opinions, but I did not state what objection I had to it. . . .  Now my opinion
is that the different States have the power to make a negro a citizen under the
Constitution of the United States if they choose.  The Dred Scott decision decides
that they have not that power.  If the State of Illinois had that power I should be
opposed to the exercise of it. . . . That is all I have to say about it.
Id. at 179.
181 Lincoln, supra note 25, at 283, 298–99 (“I never have complained especially of the
Dred Scott decision because it held that a negro could not be a citizen . . . . I mentioned as a
fact that they had decided that a negro could not be a citizen . . . . I stated that, without
making any complaint of it at all.” (emphasis added)).
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claim that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed citizens an abso-
lute freedom of opinion—and even freedom of speech—state anti-antislavery
laws and practices to the contrary notwithstanding.  Southern intolerance of
anti-slavery speech seemed absurd insofar as it effectively prevented members
of the second largest party from traveling in the South, let alone speaking
there.  Lincoln (in)famously could not safely campaign in the South.
During the 1860 campaign, Republicans increasingly complained that
the slaveholding states had violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause by
failing to secure the freedom of opinion to anti-slavery citizens.  Sometimes
the complaints extended not only to interstate intolerance, but also intrastate
intolerance—that is, toward native-born citizens of those states.  In Congress,
Maine’s John Perry complained that citizens of both free and slave states had
been “driven out . . . not for anything they have done; but merely for entertain-
ing opinions held by Washington, Jefferson, and Madison.”182  Others made
nearly identical arguments, sometimes invoking the ambiguous right to
“entertain” opinions183—which rendered ambiguous whether it encom-
passed not only the right to hold opinions, but also the right to express them.
The slave states violated the Clause, it was said, because citizens “for no other
offence than that of being known to entertain sentiments unfavourable to
slavery, have been banished from the state where they resided.”184  To cite
one example of this violence, during the 1860 campaign, William Wood, a
recent Harvard graduate, was forcibly shipped out of Charleston “for expres-
sing, under compulsion, his Republican predilections,”185 thus demonstrat-
ing to Republicans that the Clause “has had no vitality” in the South.186
To more radical, anti-Constitution abolitionists, such violence proved
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause “was worth less than the spoiled
parchment it was written on.”187  At the annual meeting of the American
Anti-Slavery Society, held in May 1860, William Lloyd Garrison introduced
the following cynical resolutions:
182 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1039–40 (1860).  Not all Republicans identified
the freedom of opinion as a privilege of citizenship.  Michigan’s Henry Waldron, for
instance, seemingly distinguished the two, by denouncing the South for violating Article IV
by restricting the right to travel and file suit, but criticizing southern intolerance for anti-
slavery speech under the First Amendment instead. Id. at 1872.
183 Richard Yates, Inaugural Address (Jan. 14, 1861), reprinted in 1 REPORTS MADE TO
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF ILLINOIS AT ITS TWENTY-SECOND SESSION 29 (1861) (complaining
that “the life of a man [is] unsafe, who entertains the opinions of Washington and Jeffer-
son on the subject of slavery”); The Times, 25 MONTHLY RELIGIOUS MAG. 127, 128 (1861)
(“What would [a southerner] say of it if the citizens of Tennessee, as soon as they touched
the soil of the Bay State, were mobbed or gibbeted for their opinions . . . ?”).
184 J.E. CAIRNES, THE SLAVE POWER 148 (1862).
185 The Irrepressible Conflict, 7 HARV. MAG. 135, 138 (1860).
186 Id.; see also JAMES PECKHAM, GEN. NATHANIEL LYON, AND MISSOURI IN 1861, at 415
(1866) (reprinting editorial written by Lyon in October 1860 in which he had argued that
the South had violated the Constitution, for “several innocent persons from the North
were seized and executed by mobs, for supposed abolitionist sentiments”).
187 Barbarism Rampant, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY,
FOR THE YEAR ENDING MAY 1860, at 166, 167 (1861).
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That the privileges accorded to southern citizens sojourning or travelling in
the North, under this Union, are these: To speak with impunity whatever
they please against free institutions and free society . . . .  That the privileges
accorded to northern citizens . . . in the South . . . are these: To wear pad-
lock upon their lips . . . to speak in behalf of the enslaved at the peril of their
lives; [and, with reference to the negro seamen acts] to be thrust into prison,
and sold as Slaves on the auction-block, if they are of African descent . . . .188
Pursuant to these widespread grievances, Republicans formally asserted
their rights to freedom of thought under the Clause.189  At the National Con-
vention in May 1860, Ohio’s Joshua Giddings (a friend and mentor to John
Bingham)190 introduced the following resolution:
That we deeply sympathize with those men who have been driven, some
from their native states and others from the states of their adoption, and are
now exiled from their homes on account of their opinions; and we hold the
Democratic party responsible for this gross violation of that clause of the
Constitution which declares that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to
all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.191
The resolution was adopted unanimously.192
This plank is remarkable in several respects.  First, although the resolu-
tion has manifest relevance to the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment,193 it has been nearly entirely overlooked by legal historians.194
188 Id. app. at 326.
189 See, e.g., Kentucky Republican Convention, HOLMES COUNTY REPUBLICAN 3 (May 3,
1860) http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84028820/1860-05-03/ed-1/seq-3/
(reporting Republicans’ resolution that “they claim the same privileges and immunities, as
citizens of the Union, Democratic or other parties; the liberty of speech, of the press, and
the ballot”).
190 Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. Bingham and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589, 600–01 (2003) (describing Bingham’s friend-
ship with and admiration for Giddings).
191 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST THREE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF 1856,
1860, AND 1864, at 165 (Horace Greeley ed., 1893).
192 Hutchins, supra note 1, at 69.
193 Among other relevant facts, the delegates at the Convention included future Justice
David Davis (part of the Slaughter-House Majority), two members of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction: Thaddeus Stevens and George Boutwell, as well as congressmen Frederick
Frelinghuysen and John Broomall.  Consider also this oft-quoted comment by Columbus
Delano in 1866:
I know very well that the citizens of the South and of the North going South have
not hitherto been safe in the South, for want of constitutional power in Congress
to protect them.  I know that white men have for a series of years been driven out
of the South, when their opinions did not concur with the chivalry of the South-
ern slaveholders.
CURTIS, supra note 104, at 138–139 (quoting Speech of Hon. Columbus Delano, at Coshoc-
ton, Ohio (Aug. 28, 1866), in SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866 IN THE STATES OF OHIO,
INDIANA AND KENTUCKY, 23, 23 (1866) [hereinafter SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866]).
This comment appears to be a paraphrase of the 1860 platform; Delano, it turns out, was,
with Giddings, a member of Ohio’s delegation at the Convention, and had seconded Lin-
coln’s initial nomination. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST THREE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CON-
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For example, this resolution, coupled with Giddings’s successful motion in
1856 to incorporate a “due process” plank in the 1856 Republican platform,
laid the groundwork for Section 1: just as the party had in 1856 declared that
the Due Process Clause prevented any federal action to foster slavery in the
territories,195 the party in 1860 added that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause prevented the states from interfering with antislavery citizens’ free-
dom of travel and opinion.  These two clauses together formed what Bing-
ham would later call that “immortal bill of rights.”196
Moreover, this resolution indicates that by 1860, the Republican Party
formally endorsed an absolute-rights reading of the Clause, and one that
would protect citizens even in their own state.  The resolve highlights the dra-
matic shift in popular constitutional interpretation; by 1860, the winning
national party thus embraced a freedom-of-opinion interpretation that, how-
ever consistent with Corfield, had once been endorsed only by some marginal
abolitionists.  As a Giddings biographer noted, “[t]his was a strong utterance
to go before the country with, and was opposed by many, but there was a
general feeling that the veteran’s vision was clear and that the country would
ratify his judgment; and it did.”197
At the same time, however, the party’s endorsement of a national free-
dom of “opinion” avoided an emphatic stand on the question of whether the
Clause entitled citizens to not only privately hold their opinions, but also the
freedom to communicate those opinions.  But during 1860 and 1861, several
prominent Republicans expressly avowed that the Clause protected not only
the Corfieldian right to travel, but also the privilege of open discussion.198
VENTIONS OF 1856, 1860, AND 1864, supra note 191, at 149.  During the ratification debates,
Governor Dennison of Ohio would similarly comment that, before the War, a traveling
citizen in the South had the “rights and dignity as an American citizen,” including not only
the “right to sue or be sued, [and] to contract or be contracted with,” but also the right to
“express your opinions freely upon the great questions that were dividing the American
people.”  Governor Dennison’s Speech, in SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866, supra, at
44.
194 For a rare and recent exception, see this brief remark in Andrew T. Hyman, The Due
Process Plank, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 229, 252 n.120 (2013).
195 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST THREE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF 1856,
1860, AND 1864, supra note 191, at 133.
196 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
197 Byron R. Long, Joshua Reed Giddings: A Champion of Political Freedom, 28 OHIO
ARCHAEOLOGICAL & HIST. PUBL’N 1, 47 (1919).
198 Compare Yates, supra note 183, at 29 (noting southern claims that it is “unsafe to
tolerate freedom of speech, or the presence of suspicious persons,” but still “we cannot and
will not relinquish our right to the protection of the laws, under the constitution of our
common country”), with Alex. W. Randall, Governor’s Message (May 15, 1861), in JOURNAL
OF THE SENATE OF WISCONSIN 4, 10 (1861) (listing rights that needed constitutional protec-
tion).  Governor Randall of Wisconsin said:
The right of the people of every state to go into every other state and engage in
any lawful pursuit, without unlawful interference or molestation; the freedom of
speech and of the press; the right of trial by jury; security from unjustifiable
seizure of person or papers, and all constitutional privileges and immunities,
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 38 30-MAR-16 15:52
1154 notre dame law review [vol. 91:3
Maine Congressmen Daniel Somes quoted the Clause to support his claim
that northern citizens have a right to publish and speak abolitionist opinions
in the South.199  In an impassioned speech in Congress, Owen Lovejoy, with
apparent reference to the Clause, invoked “the aid of the General Govern-
ment to protect me, as an American citizen, in my rights as an American
citizen” including “the right of discussing this question of slavery anywhere,
on any square foot of American soil over which the stars and stripes float, and
to which the privileges and immunities of the Constitution extend.”200
In a similar vein, Republican jurist Daniel Gardner, in his 1860 treatise
on international law, affirmed that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
secured certain “right[s] of American citizenship” and identified, among
these “universal American rights,” not only the travel and economic privi-
leges enumerated in Corfield, but also the “[f]reedom of speech and of the
press, and security of life, liberty, and property.”201  Just a year earlier, Bing-
ham, for his part, had declared these “privileges and immunities of citizens”
to include not only the Corfieldian economic liberties “to work and enjoy the
product of their toil,” but also the freedom “to argue and to utter, according
to conscience.”202
must receive new guarantees of safety from tar and feathers, and halters and
mobs.
Randall, supra; see also William Dennison, Governor’s Message (Jan. 7, 1861), in 1 MESSAGE
AND REPORTS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF OHIO FOR THE
YEAR 1860, at 537, 563 (1861) (calling for Southern States to repeal “such of their laws as
contravene the constitutional rights of the citizens of the Free States,” who rightly “claim
and will insist upon all their constitutional rights in every State and Territory of the
Confederacy”).
199 Daniel E. Somes, Letter from Hon. Daniel E. Somes to Hon. Gerrit Smith, BOS. LIBERATOR,
Oct. 5, 1860, at 159.
200 APPENDIX TO THE CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1860).  An unsigned,
sarcastic op-ed in a Vermont newspaper read:
Has [South Carolina] not made large sacrifices of her native feathers and indigi-
nous tar, and bestowed them freely upon our foolhardy brethren, who, in the face
and eyes of Section 2, of article 4, of the federal constitution: “The citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of
the several States,” have had the recklessness to invade the sovereignty of said
kingdom, for the nefarious purpose of circulating incendiary documents, such as
the Bible and other kindred works?
Opinion, The Union Turned Out, LAMOILLE NEWSDEALER (Hyde Park, VT) (Dec. 28, 1860),
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84023428/1860-12-28/ed-1/seq-2/.
201 DANIEL GARDNER, INSTITUTES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 480–83
(1860).  Gardner would later write a strong defense of the legality of the Emancipation
Proclamation. See ALLEN C. GUELZO, LINCOLN’S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 193–94
(2004).  New York jurist and abolitionist Edward Bullard likewise argued that the Clause
secured the right of northern citizens to the “freedom of speech” in the southern states.
EDWARD F. BULLARD, THE NATION’S TRIAL 47 (1863).
202 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984–85 (1859).  Bingham here was quoting from
Milton’s famous defense of freedom of the press; like James Wilson and others, Milton had
identified this right as an immunity of “free government.” See John Milton, Areopagitica: A
Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of England, in 1 THE
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C. The Privileges and Immunities Clause as Proposed by the
Washington Peace Conference
After the election, during the Winter of Secession, Republicans did not
forget their platform.  In the debates over compromise measures, mostly
designed to mollify secessionists, Republicans still insisted that something be
offered to the North; a common proposal was a statute or constitutional
amendment securing congressional enforcement of the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause.  Some of these measures aimed merely at that equal protection
necessary to permit safe travel and residence.  The House Committee of
Thirty-Three, for instance, called for enforcement of the Clause, and peti-
tioned state legislatures to take the initiative, and thus obviate the need for
federal action, to ensure that traveling citizens enjoy (1) “the same protec-
tion as citizens of such State enjoy” and (2) protection “against popular vio-
lence or illegal summary punishment, without trial in due form of law, for
imputed crimes.”203
At the Washington Peace Conference, a quasi-constitutional convention
held in February, an even broader constitutional amendment was debated
and approved.  The delegates included four of the fifteen future members of
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction—Maine’s William Fessenden (the
Committee’s chair), Iowa’s James Grimes, Massachusetts’s George Boutwell,
and Maryland’s Reverdy Johnson—as well as other future members of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress, such as New Jersey’s Frederick Frelinghuysen and
Maine’s Lot Morrill.204  The delegates also included Pennsylvania’s David
Wilmot (of “Wilmot Proviso” fame), future Chief Justice Salmon Chase, and
David Dudley Field, brother to future Justice Stephen Field.205
It was David Field who first introduced a proposal to incorporate into
the proposed Thirteenth Amendment the requirement that Congress enforce
the Privileges and Immunities Clause: “Congress shall provide by law for
securing to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States.”206  Field said that this addition would make a compro-
mise amendment “much more acceptable to the northern people,”207 by
“secur[ing] protection in the South to the citizens of the free States.”208  For
a similar purpose, Wilmot proposed a measure that would require Congress
to provide monetary compensation to victims of mob violence.209  Wilmot’s
proposal had the distinct advantage of easy enforcement, as mere monetary
PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 166, 188 (J.W. Moore ed. 1859) (stating that “the immedi-
ate cause of all this free writing and free speaking [is] your own mild, and free, and humane
government” and that apart from “just immunities . . . [g]ive me the liberty to know, to utter,
and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties” (emphasis added)).
203 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1261 (1861).
204 CHITTENDEN, supra note 2, at 18, 30.
205 Id. at 18–19, 28.
206 Id. at 162.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 169.
209 Id. at 208.
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compensation would not require an extensive coercive presence to protect
antislavery travelers and speakers.
Eventually, after some debate, the Convention adopted a proposal intro-
duced by Frelinghuysen in this way:
The people of the free States have complained, and not without good rea-
son, that one clause in the Constitution is not carried into effect in some of
the slaveholding States.  Their complaints are similar to those made on the
part of the South, which it is the purpose of the seventh section to remove.
If there have been instances at the North where mobs and riotous assemblies
have obstructed the administration of justice in the case of fugitive slaves, so
there have been instances at the South where mobs and riots have disre-
garded the rights of citizens of Northern States.  I propose to deal fairly by
all sections.  Let us remove both causes of complaint.  I move to amend the
seventh section by adding thereto the following words: “Congress shall pro-
vide by law for securing to the citizens of each State the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens in the several States.”210
This section was approved on a strictly sectional vote: all of the free
states, and two of the border slaveholdings states (Delaware and Maryland)
approved, while Kentucky and Missouri joined Virginia, North Carolina, and
Tennessee in dissent.211  The provision formed the last clause of the Conven-
tion’s proposed Thirteenth Amendment.212
The debates over this proposed Privileges and Immunities Clause high-
light three key features of Republican approaches to the original Privileges
and Immunities Clause on the eve of the Civil War.  First, the debates demon-
strate the degree to which black citizenship divided northern opinion.  When
Illinois delegate Thomas Turner reiterated Field’s initial proposal,213 the
measure was temporarily defeated by a poison pill introduced by Illinois’s
Stephen Logan, who moved to add the qualifier “ ‘free white’ before the word
‘citizens.’”214  Logan’s racial amendment was approved by virtually all of the
states outside the northeast, with only the New England states, New York, and
Iowa dissenting.215  Thus amended, however, the measure pleased no one
and was unanimously rejected by all the state delegations.216  Eventually
northerners were able to coordinate and approve the “clean” version, as re-
proposed by Frelinghuysen.  A few southern delegates, after the Conference,
attributed the failure to incorporate the racial restriction to northerners’
thinly veiled effort to give free blacks Article IV rights.217  Still, the available
210 Id. at 384–85.
211 Id. at 385.
212 Id. at 473.
213 Id. at 380.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 381.
217 STATE OF MO., JOURNAL OF THE H.R., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE PEACE CON-
FERENCE, 21, 1st Sess., App. at 574 (1861) (explaining that “after a failure, on our part, to
make it apply only to ‘free white’ citizens, it was adopted by the vote of all the non-slave-
holding States” and asserting that “the last clause makes it imperative on Congress to pro-
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records indicate that northern delegates were concerned primarily, if not
exclusively, with the rights of white citizens.218
Second, these debates also revealed the degree to which southern lead-
ers feared, and at least some northerners hoped, that congressional enforce-
ment of the Clause would secure not only the right to travel, but also the
freedom of antislavery speech.  Kentucky’s James Guthrie objected that Wil-
mot’s proposal would “encourage[ ] seditious speeches at the South,”219 and
Tennessee’s William Stephens complained the resulting “seditious speeches
and purposes” would “excite discontent among our slaves.”220  In the subse-
quent debates in the Senate, southern opponents likewise objected that this
proposal would give “[a]bolition leaders the right to promulgate their doc-
trines in the slave States.”221  His Virginian colleague, Robert Hunter, was
equally indignant:
Congress shall have power to pass laws to force the States to receive those
persons whom they have excluded from police considerations—considera-
tions of domestic safety. Yes, sir, to force the States to receive persons who
would be dangerous to their peace; to force upon them, if you will, abolition
lecturers; to force upon them persons whom they regard as the most danger-
ous emissaries that could be sent among them; to enable Congress to
obtrude, in fact, into all the business of the States.222
In response, Northerners provided no reassurances.  In the Convention,
Wilmot tersely replied that Congress would not “protect a man in making
seditious speeches in the slave States.”223  But he neither defined the word
“seditious” nor said anything about non-seditious speech.224  Meanwhile, in
the House of Representatives, Connecticut’s Alfred Burham was openly
demanding protection for free speech in the South.  In his view, a properly
enforced Article IV would protect not only the property rights of the slave-
holder (under the Fugitive Slave Clause), but the personal rights of freemen
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, including the freedom of
speech and press:
Is not the right of protection to the person as high a right as protection to
property?  Shall this Government be destroyed because citizens of slave
States are sometimes wrongfully deprived of their property by citizens of free
States; and shall no complaint be heard when to us the freedom of the
courts, the freedom of the elective franchise, the freedom of the press, the
vide that citizens in one State shall have the same rights in all the States, without regard to
color”); George Davis, Speech at Thalian Hall: The “Peace Congress” and Its Failure, in
NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL WAR DOCUMENTARY 19, 21 (W. Buck Yearns & John G. Barrett eds.,
2002).
218 See supra text accompanying notes 213–14.
219 CHITTENDEN, supra note 2, at 381.
220 Id. at 382.
221 DANIEL WAIT HOWE, POLITICAL HISTORY OF SECESSION: TO THE BEGINNING OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 474 (1914).
222 CHITTENDEN, supra note 2, app. at 495–96.
223 Id. at 381.
224 Id.
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freedom of speech, and the freedom of conscience are all stricken down?
[A]nd when our own unoffending citizens of both sexes, and of all ages, are
insulted, tarred and feathered, imprisoned, robbed, scourged, and in many
instances murdered, by lawless and irresponsible mobs?  But, sir, I will not
pursue this further.  I say, sir, with the committee, let there be a faithful
observance on the part of all the States, and of all the citizens thereof, of all
their constitutional obligations to each other and to the Federal Govern-
ment; and let such necessary laws be enacted as will carry out that provision
of the Constitution which declares that the citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States;
and much will have been done towards restoring peace and harmony
towards our distracted country.225
In particular, Burnham said, southerners had violated the Clause, for:
[T]o us there is no freedom of speech among them, and that we would be
mobbed for speaking the sentiment of Washington and Jefferson.  And, sir,
it is even said tauntingly of our President elect, that he dare not go and
advocate his principles in the State [Kentucky] where rest the bones of his
kindred.226
Third, the measure, as proposed, avoided the complicated question
whether Congress already had the power to enforce the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause.  The Supreme Court, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, had endorsed
congressional power to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause.227  Many future
Republicans, like Giddings and Chase, had denounced the decision.228
Many, however, like Lincoln, that Kentucky native, fully endorsed Prigg and
concluded that the Constitution not only empowered, but required Congress
to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause.229  The authors of the proposed Thir-
teenth Amendment, however, avoided the question: the Clause stipulated
that “Congress shall provide by law for securing . . .”;230 in this way, the exis-
tence of this congressional power was either assumed or granted by imposing
the duty to exercise it.
On March 2, 1861, the Senate overwhelmingly rejected the Peace Con-
ference’s proposed amendment.231  Two days later, upon his inauguration,
Lincoln not only promised to enforce faithfully the Fugitive Slave Law but
also advocated the adoption of a Privileges and Immunities Law: “And might
it not be well, at the same time, to provide by law for the enforcement of that
clause in the Constitution which guarranties that ‘The citizens of each State
225 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 971 (1861) (Speech of Hon. A.A. Burnham,
Upon the Report of the Committee of Thirty-Three Upon the State of the Union to the
House of Representatives).
226 Id. at 970.
227 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
228 William M. Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition Before the United States Supreme Court,
1820–1860, in HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ABOLITIONIST MOVEMENT: ABOLITIONISM AND
AMERICAN LAW 145–47 (John R. McKivigan ed., 1999).
229 Lincoln, supra note 25, at 283, 317–18.
230 CHITTENDEN, supra note 2, at 162.
231 The vote was twenty-eight to seven against. CHITTENDEN, supra note 2, app. at 571.
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shall be entitled to all previleges [sic] and immunities of citizens in the sev-
eral States?”232  Lincoln did not elsewhere explain this proposal.233  Still, the
context, including his enthusiastic support for the whole Republican plat-
form,234 indicates that his goal was primarily, if not exclusively, to protect the
travel and opinion (or even speech) rights of white northerners, and not
(yet) to secure the citizenship of free blacks.235  Neither he nor his fellow
Republicans were hoping to enjoy merely an exemption from interstate
discrimination.
D. The Political Marginalization of the Interstate-Equality Reading
On the eve of the Civil War, then, the dominant political parties in the
North and South ignored or rejected the strict in parti conditione reading.
Instead, Republicans feared, and southern Democrats hoped, that the
Supreme Court would enforce the Clause so as to require the free states to
tolerate slavery.  Meanwhile, southern Democrats feared, and Republicans
hoped, that the Congress would enforce the Clause so as to require the slave
states to tolerate the presence and even speech of antislavery citizens—per-
haps regardless of race.
Despite this apparent opposition, there was substantial overlap between
these two positions—an overlap that could be called a political consensus in
1860: that a national standard determined the privileges and immunities to
be enjoyed in the other states, local laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
Some Republicans were attentive to this convergence and invoked the pro-
slavery reading of the Clause to support their anti-slavery, pro-black-citizen-
ship reading.
232 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address—Final Text (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 COL-
LECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 264 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
233 The next day, however, Lincoln again mentioned the Privileges and Immunities
Clause to support not freedom of speech but moderation of speech: “We must remember
that the people of all the States are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the
citizens of the several States.  We should bear this in mind, and act in such a way as to say
nothing insulting or irritating.  I would inculcate this idea, so that we may not, like Phari-
sees, set ourselves up to be better than other people.”  Abraham Lincoln, Reply to Penn-
sylvania Delegation (Mar. 5, 1861), in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra
note 232, at 273, 274.
234 Abraham Lincoln, Letter to George Ashum (May 23, 1860), in 4 COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 232, at 52–53.
235 To my knowledge, the only contemporary scholars to notice the importance of Lin-
coln’s proposal are the political theorists Harry Jaffa and Joseph Fornieri, but both assert,
erroneously, I believe, that Lincoln was aiming to protect free blacks. HARRY V. JAFFA, A
NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 266–67
(2000); Joseph R. Fornieri, Lincoln’s Critique of Dred Scott as a Vindication of the Found-
ing, in LINCOLN AND FREEDOM: SLAVERY, EMANCIPATION, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
20, 25 (Harold Holzer & Sara Vaughn Gabbard eds., 2007).  But for contemporaries, the
privileges to which Lincoln referred were those that “had not been fully enjoyed by citizens
of the Free-Labor States while in the Slave-Labor States, for many years.”  1 BENSON J. LOS-
SING, PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 291 (1866).
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Yale’s William Larned, for instance, expressly embraced Taney’s argu-
ment—viz., that if free blacks were citizens, they would enjoy an absolute
right travel, hold meetings, bear arms, etc.; Larned called this passage “the
strongest portion of Judge Taney’s argument.”236  Taney’s parade of hor-
ribles was no doubt Larned’s fond hope.  In response to Taney’s fear that
black citizenship would jeopardize the peace and safety of the slaveholding
states, Larned replied that both “[t]he inconveniences resulting to the South-
ern states from the operation of this clause are greatly magnified.”237  Moreo-
ver, such a concern could not justify the Court’s nullification of the plain text
of Article IV:
It is not the province of the Court to legislate, but to interpret.  These topics
of inconvenience, therefore, cannot be intended as arguments against the
policy of the clause, but as indications of the meaning of the clause in the
minds of those who made it.  [Taney claims] that when the great men of the
slave-holding states made or assented to this clause of the Constitution, that
“the citizens of each state should be entitled” to the privilege of a general
citizenship in the United States, they must have meant, not what their words
[that is, “citizens”] say they mean, but what the circumstances of the case
show they must have meant.  But we ask, as we have often asked before, can
conjectures of this kind, however plausible, nullify the plainest language of
the Constitution?  Indeed, when shall this kind of interpretation end?238
Larned then reiterated his endorsement of Taney’s definition of the
“privilege[s] of a general citizenship in the United States,” but with one glar-
ing correction:
This clause gives to abolitionists the right to enter any state whenever they
please, singly or in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruc-
tion, to sojourn there as long as they please; to hold public meetings upon
public affairs, and to enjoy full liberty of speech, in public and private, upon
any subject whatever.239
For Larned, therefore, Taney’s interpretation was entirely accurate but
with two major exceptions: (1) free blacks were, in fact, citizens of the United
States, and (2) the privileges of national citizenship included the full free-
dom of speech, including abolitionist speech, state laws to the contrary
notwithstanding.
In his treatise on slavery, John Codman Hurd likewise employed Taney’s
dicta to support his claim that the Clause secured national privileges to
sojourning citizens.240  Unlike Larned, however, Hurd was more subtle.
236 W.A. Larned, Negro Citizenship, in 15 NEW ENGLANDER 478, 517 (1857).
237 Id.
238 Id. at 518 (emphasis omitted).
239 Id. (emphasis added).
240 For Hurd, the standard was the common-law privileges enjoyed in British North
America:
[T]he effect of this clause is to continue the pre-existing common law of the
colonies so far as it contained a standard of the rights of citizens of one locality
appearing as domestic aliens within another jurisdiction; although, by the revolu-
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Although conceding the antebellum prevalence of the strictly interstate-
equality reading,241 Hurd cited Corfield as contrary, more favorable author-
ity,242 and also quoted at length, with virtually no commentary, the two dicta
from Taney’s decision that strongly indicated a national standard.243  Hurd
thus left it to his readers to draw the connection: that Chief Justice Taney and
Justice Bushrod Washington had properly identified a national standard of
privileges.
In the 1859 debates over Oregon’s admission, two House Republicans
likewise cited Taney in support of the Republican reading of the Clause.
Henry Dawes, of Massachusetts, argued that if free blacks were citizens,
then according to the Constitution, as expounded in the Dred Scott decision
itself, this provision [of the proposed Oregon constitution] which attempts,
not only to drive them from its border, but to prevent their holding prop-
erty, making contracts, suing in the courts, or even eating the bread of life
within her borders, does violate [the Privileges and Immunities Clause].244
Bingham likewise cited Taney as authority supporting the identity of “the
people” with “the citizens,” with a nod to his Democratic colleagues “who
profess a more than Eastern devotion to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and its decision in the Dred Scott case.”245
Even during Reconstruction, Republicans occasionally cited Taney’s
exposition of constitutional “privileges and immunities.”  In the Fourteenth
Amendment debates, Missouri’s Senator John Henderson cited Taney’s opin-
ion in discussing “all the personal rights, privileges, and immunities” of citi-
zenship.246  The author “Madison,” writing in the New York Times, likewise
marshaled Taney’s authority to assert the existence of certain “rights of citi-
zenship as a member of the Union,” which “rights and privileges of a citizen
of the United States . . . are summed up in [Corfield],” and would be pro-
tion and the establishment of new forms of government, the privileges and immu-
nities of citizenship in the case of domiciled inhabitants became altogether
determinable by local law.
HURD, supra note 145, at 353.
241 Id. at 352 (noting that most legal authorities “would find the standard [of privileges
and immunities] rather in the rights enjoyed by citizens domiciled in the forum of jurisdic-
tion, than in a national standard of privilege” (footnote omitted)).
242 Id. at 351 (stating that Justice Washington “seems to recognize the existence of
some national and quasi-international standard of rights which are ‘fundamental and
belong of right to the citizens of free governments’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Corfield
v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230))).
243 Id. at 291–92, 347 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416–17,
428 (1857)).
244 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 975 (1859); see also Avins, supra note 15, at 15.
245 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859).  A few years later, upon Taney’s
death, one obituary writer quoted Taney’s parade of horribles and added indignantly, “as if
the blessings of liberty ought not to prevail over any inconveniences to slave-holders.”
Charles M. Ellis, Roger Brooke Taney, 15 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 157 (1865).
246 BOGEN, supra note 21, at 51 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 3032–33
(1866)).
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tected by the Amendment.247  And in the courts, Republican judges in Indi-
ana and Alabama cited Taney’s opinion to invalidate, state laws that
prohibited African Americans, respectively, from making enforceable con-
tracts,248 and from intermarrying with whites.249  In sum, as David Bogen has
affirmed, “[i]n a general sense, the framers of the Civil War Amendments
shared Taney’s view and thus sought to effectuate a broad spectrum of rights
when they guaranteed the privileges and immunities of citizenship to
blacks.”250
In this political atmosphere, where the extremes met, the seemingly
moderate, centrist interstate-equality reading became effectively marginalized.
For the most part, in the political debates, few still vindicated this seemingly
moderate, even judicious position.  One notable exception came, not surpris-
ingly, from a border state’s delegation to the Peace Conference.  In their
subsequent report to the Kentucky legislature, they explained that congres-
sional enforcement of the Privileges and Immunities Clause would be ano-
dyne.  The original Clause, they wrote, only “operates as a prohibition to
each State from discriminating against the citizens of other States, and would
make void all such legislation.  The clause [proposed by the Conference]
cannot do more than to make such discriminating laws void, and is therefore
harmless.”251
In other words, this provision of the proposed Thirteenth Amendment
would be largely a vain and idle enactment.
In the courts, however, the interstate-equality reading still
predominated—even in the northern states.  Northern Democrats like Benja-
min Curtis in Dred Scott, and Hiram Denio in the Lemmon case had seemingly
endorsed the position.252  This reading, moreover, was vindicated in several
cases—even in the “reddest” of Republican states like Connecticut.253  In
Minnesota, the State Supreme Court proposed this apparently straightfor-
ward reading, as a way of resolving many disputes: “Such an interpretation
would, it is confidently believed, furnish an easy and satisfactory solution of
many troublesome questions.”254  Still, this holding, expressed as a proposal,
indicates that many Americans did not share the court’s understanding.
247 Madison, Letter to the Editor, The Constitutional Amendments—National Citizenship,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1866.
248 Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 302–03 (1866) (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
at 422–23).
249 Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 197–98 (1872) (arguing that Taney had indicated that
laws prohibiting interracial marriage were incompatible with constitutional citizenship).
250 David S. Bogen, The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the
Admission of Maryland’s First Black Lawyers, 44 MD. L. REV. 939, 947 (1985).
251 REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY COMMISSIONERS TO THE LATE PEACE CONFERENCE HELD AT
WASHINGTON CITY 9–10 (1861) (emphasis added).
252 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 583–84 (Curtis, J., dissenting); Lemmon v. People,
20 N.Y. 562, 608 (1860).
253 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179, 183 (1857).
254 Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 1, 9 (1862).
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One may well speculate as to why judges, even in northern states, were so
reluctant to adopt the Republican understanding of the Clause.  At least two
factors were probably important.  First, given the long political dominance of
Jacksonian Democrats, Republicans were underrepresented in the federal
judiciary and, to a lesser extent, even the state courts.  Second, the judicial
temperament was likely to prefer the interstate-equality reading to the abso-
lute-rights reading of the Clause, given that the latter was (seemingly) novel
and partisan, and might require far more judicial oversight of the political
branches—and force them to declare that they and their fellow state citizens
were entitled to fewer rights than visitors.
CONCLUSION
At the close of the Civil War, Republicans did not forget their antebel-
lum project to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  For many, com-
plete victory required not only the defeat of secession and the abolition of
slavery, but also, among other measures, the federal enforcement of the
Clause.  These efforts were manifest in treatises,255 at least one state party
platform,256 a judicial opinion,257 editorials,258 congressional speeches259 a
255 WILLIAM GOODELL, OUR NATIONAL CHARTERS 56 n.41 (1863) (reiterating his objec-
tion from two decades earlier that the slave states “notoriously violated” the Clause by stat-
utes and usages that prevented free blacks and antislavery citizens from traveling or
residing in those states).
256 1 HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF INDIANA 36 (Russel M. Seeds ed., 1899)
(reprinting the platform, including its resolution “[t]hat the Constitutional provision, ‘that
the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states,’ shall be enforced by proper Congressional legislation”).
257 In re Dorsey (E.D. Va. 1862), reprinted in MCPHERSON, supra note 75, at 442–43
(asserting “that the neglect to give practical effect to this constitutional provision has been
an efficient cause of the war now desolating the country” including Congress’s failure to
confer remedial authority on the federal courts, but that Congress would likely provide
relief “at the approaching session” (opinion of Underwood, J.)).
258 Editorial, What Shall Be Done with the Negro?, NAT’L REPUBLICAN (Oct. 8, 1862), http:/
/chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82014760/1862-10-08/ed-1/seq-2/ (decrying anti-
black legislation in some northern states because native free blacks are “entitled to all the
immunities and privileges of an American citizen”); Traveler, Letter to the Editor, BEL-
MONT CHRON. (St. Clairsville, OH) (July 20, 1865), http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/
lccn/sn85026241/1865-07-20/ed-1/seq-2/ (stating that to address the “grave questions of
human rights and national policy,” the Privileges and Immunities Clause “must soon be
called out from its privacy and its principles tested”).
259 1 JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD, Restoration of the Southern States: Speech Delivered in
the House of Representatives (Feb. 1, 1866), in THE WORKS OF JAMES A. GARFIELD 95,
110–111 (Burke A. Hinsdale ed., 1882) (calling for a constitutional amendment to author-
ize Congress to enforce the Due Process and the Privileges and Immunities Clauses—so
that “American citizenship [might become] the shield that protects every citizen, on every
foot of our soil”).
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Senate resolution,260 and ultimately the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion’s first draft.261
As indicated in the Introduction, the ambition of this Article is not to
provide a comprehensive account of the original understanding of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause.  Still less does this Article hope to fully explain
why this understanding was eviscerated by the Supreme Court.  Nonetheless,
the historical evidence presented here suggests the following hypotheses that
are worth further investigation.
First, Justice Miller, in the Slaughter-House Cases, was almost certainly mis-
taken in asserting that apart from the purpose to secure the freedom and
citizenship of African-Americans, “none of [the Reconstruction Amend-
ments] would have been even suggested.”262  To the contrary, even when
Republicans proposed merely a containment policy on slavery, and were
divided as to black citizenship, Republicans formally proposed statutes and
constitutional amendments to better secure the white citizen’s constitutional
“privileges and immunities.”  And in 1860, the main issue of concern was the
white antislavery citizen’s right to travel and reside throughout the Union,
with full freedom to entertain, and perhaps communicate, his opinions.
Second, Justice Miller was very probably mistaken in asserting that the
“privileges and immunities” to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
were sharply distinct from the privileges secured by Article IV.  The Amend-
ment was preceded by a decades-old struggle, intensified on the eve of the
Civil War, concerning the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  This dispute
concerned the persons protected, the privileges guaranteed, and the propri-
ety of congressional enforcement.  In contrast, there is no record of any ante-
bellum struggle to protect some set of “privileges and immunities” distinct
from those of Article IV.
Third, the evidence indicates why the authors of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment elected to use the term “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.”  As indicated above, the term had been used as a gloss on the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, to clarify that the privileges to be accorded
citizens from other states did not include the privileges, such as political
rights, that each state might properly reserve to its own citizens.  By using this
clarifying term, the Joint Committee sought to address one of the chief objec-
tions to the Amendment’s first draft: that arguably Article IV privileges
included political rights.263
Fourth, the evidence helps explain Bingham’s enthusiasm for the Due
Process and Privileges and Immunities Clause, and his reason for calling
those two provisions the “immortal bill of rights.”  These two clauses had
been quoted in the Republican Platform of 1860.  And it was his mentor,
260 S. JOURNAL, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 126 (1866).
261 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866).
262 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873).
263 See, e.g., APPENDIX TO THE CONG GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess., 135 (remarks of Rep.
Andrew Rogers of New Jersey).
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Joshua Giddings, who had moved for the platform to include these
provisions.
Fifth, the evidence provides support for what may be called partial incor-
poration—of freedom of speech and of the press, in particular.  Still, this
author has seen no evidence supporting the claim that anyone before the
Civil War believed that the “privileges and immunities of citizens” encom-
passed all the rights secured against federal violation by the first eight
amendments.  Further, the evidence strongly undermines any claim that
Americans believed that the federal Constitution’s specific provisions
exhausted the scope of these privileges.  The right to travel and acquire real
estate, for instance, figured prominently in nearly all the partial catalogues of
citizenship’s privileges.
Finally, the evidence gives some suggestion as to why the eventual Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause was vulnerable to judicial misconstruction,
whether deliberate or accidental.
The Clause by its strict terms did not settle, but raised a question.  Other
Reconstruction amendments settled questions.  Most Americans shared a
roughly similar understanding of the phrase “neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude shall exist”; proslavery Americans hated the idea, and antislavery
Americans celebrated it.  The Thirteenth Amendment settled that question.
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment likewise settled a
major question.  But the provision that that no state shall abridge the “privi-
leges or immunities of citizens” was to forbid something that no major politi-
cian or judge ever embraced.  The real point in dispute had been the very
meaning of “privileges and immunities of citizens.”
Nor was this issue effectively settled by the war.  To be sure, the pro-
slavery, absolute-rights reading effectively died, but the two other interpreta-
tions—both the Republican and the interstate-equality reading—survived.
While the Republican reading no doubt prevailed among the members of
Congress and state legislators who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, the
interstate-equality reading probably still was dominant in the judiciary—
where Republicans had far, far less dominance.  Further, even Republican
judges were likely resistant to the Republican political interpretation, for it
had been born of decidedly partisan, even sectional passions, and to that
extent, may have appeared improper and unreliable to a judicious tempera-
ment.  Moreover, the weight of precedent seemed to support the apparently
simple, moderate, and equitable interstate-equality understanding.  The best
precedent for the Republican position, ironically, was the Chief Justice’s
opinion in Dred Scott, but that decision had been so thoroughly repudiated,
especially by Republicans, that it no longer was much of a precedent at all.
It was not surprising, then, that in deciding the meaning of “privileges
and immunities of citizens” during Reconstruction, the Supreme Court
looked not to the Republican Party platform of 1860 and other antislavery
interpretations, and, of course, not to the pro-slavery interpretations.  Rather,
the Court, in an opinion drafted by Democrat Stephen Field, looked to the
interstate-equality reading offered by the Democrat Judge Denio in the Lem-
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mon case.  Indeed, Lemmon was the sole case cited in the Court’s unanimous
opinion in Paul v. Virginia.  The equitable appeal of Lemmon was nearly irre-
sistible in Paul: an insurance salesman from New York, while in Virginia,
would be entitled to the same interstate equality that a slaveholder from Vir-
ginia had been entitled in New York.
Paul v. Virginia, in turn, became the sole case cited by the majority in
Slaughter-House, when it interpreted the different “privileges and immunities”
secured by Article IV and Amendment XIV.  So Lemmon, authored by the
northern Democrat Hiram Denio, became the progenitor of the Slaughter-
House Cases, but it was Republican platform, speeches, and articles that were
probably the progenitors of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It was this sharp
distinction—judicial versus political, corresponding to two different antebel-
lum interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause—that was proba-
bly responsible, in part, for the dormition of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
